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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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21 February 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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POLAND

PROVINCIAL REPORTS-ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN REPORTED

Analysis of Work Force Matters

Lodz GLOS ROBOTNICZY in Polish 28 Nov 83 p 3

Article by STR: "PZPR Reports-Elections Campaign at Pamotex. In-depth Analysis of All Work Force Concerns"

Text On Saturday, 97 delegates from 17 OOP's departmental party organizations took part in a factory-wide PZPR conference at the Pamotex Revolution of 1905 Memorial PZPB State Cotton Industry Plant at Pabianice. Those participating in the deliberations included Pamotex employee and PZPR Central Committee member Marek Mokrzysek, PZPR Lodz Committee Secretary Maria Wawrzynska, MPChil Ministry of Chemical and Light Industries planning department director Jan Wesolowski, PZPR Pabianice KM city committee First Secretary Zdzislaw Bubak, and Pabianice Mayor Bogdan Kunka.

Following a report delivered by KZ plant committee First Secretary Miroslaw Kilasinski on behalf of the outgoing executive board, accounting reports were received from the plant party control commission and from the audit commission. An extensive and penetrating assessment of the Pamotex PZPR POP basic party organization was made on behalf of the Pabianice city committee's executive board by KM First Secretary Zdzislaw Bubak, who has insider's familiarity with the organization as a rank-and-file member of one of the Pamotex OOP's.

He pointed out the Pamotex POP's critical and honest self-evaluation in the reporting statements. Outstanding in Pabianice as the city's largest and most active organization, it is regarded by the city committee as a partner, advisor and consultant rather than a lower-level unit. Many among its initiatives have been included in operational programs of the Pabianice party organization. Pamotex POP members are active in all citywide organizations. Main tasks for the Pamotex POP's new term include consolidation of its worker core and more effective work with youth, primarily by assigning specific tasks to its 45 members who belong to the ZSMP.

Two problems recurred in the reports and discussions: internal party activities and the party's impact on the work force in relation to Pamotex economic performance. Emphasis was placed on the inseparability of economics and politics in action. Low levels of commitment to party activities, trade unions, and mass organizations cannot, therefore, be tolerated on the part of administrative personnel. The administrative OOP had the lowest attendance at its reports-elections meeting, which is telling about attitudes among administrative personnel.

The program provides for revitalized activities in this area by tasking all supervisory personnel, including foremen, with specific party assignments related to their official duties. Such tasks, ~~to be~~ accounted for periodically, will be assigned to all party members, which is a necessary precondition for reinvigorating the organization down to the last man.

As resolved, the purport of the 13th Plenum of PZPR Central Committee will be made a permanent component of operational programs for all party units at Pamotex and will determine topics for training sessions and propaganda activities. The implications of the 14th Plenum will soon be analyzed at all OOP's and party subunits. Specific conclusions will be implemented so that Pamotex is managed more effectively to manufacture more economically.

On these counts, much remains to be done, according to Pamotex chief director Apoloniusz Wolf, ministry representative Jan Wesolowski, spinning department OOP First Secretary Ryszard Maj, NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] chairman Czeslaw Packi, and worker board chairman Marek Dalkowski. Recently, Pamotex has been showing improved performance, notably in September and October 1983. Prime costs are, however, still unacceptably high. Reserve capacities must be sought at all departments and positions. Contests for improvement suggestions should be launched again, including some drives formerly run by youth groups.

While emphasizing worker traditions at the 160-year old Pamotex, secretary of the KL [Lodz Committee] Maria Wawrzynska focused on the need to expand its aktiv and to mount a comprehensive effort.

Miroslaw Kilasinski was elected first secretary of the PZPR plant committee, Zdzislaw Bubak, Miroslaw Kilasinski, and Miroslaw Tosik were elected delegates to the provincial conference. Moreover, 36 delegates to the city conference were elected. The delegates were instructed to take action on the Pamotex PZPR organization's proposal to establish a party medal commemorating Ludwik Warynski.

Conference on Future

Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 28 Nov 83 pp 1,3

/Article by Wlodzimierz Wodecki: "Party Conference at Gdynia Port. Reckoning With an Eye to the Future"/

/Text/ Gdynia Port builder engineer Tadeusz Wenda's was the spirit ministering over the reports-elections conference of the port POP this year. His photo portrait was the final item in a series of photographic exhibits evoking the origin of the port, its beginnings in the 1920's when the "Kentucky" put in as the first vessel, the May First celebrations, and horrible squalor of the city's outskirts. As if to remind us of the current threat, there is also a photograph of Wehrmacht troops on Swietojska Street. A good chunk of the stormy past of the port and the city.

The times have changed, but some of Gdynia's legendary pioneer past survives among the port work force: its political commitment and a formative mold, known rather inelegantly as the cadre force for the city government authorities. Former port employees now hold all top political and administrative positions in Gdynia City, including PZPR City Committee First Secretary Zygmunt Rosiak (elected as a delegate to the city conference) and Vice Mayor Franciszek Badowski, both present at the conference along with many others.

Gdynia City has some other larger plants, shipyards for one, yet the port never ceases to be the focus of the city's attention, and the public mood in Gdynia is affected by what goes on inside the port. This is perhaps the reason why attendance at the conference was seen as advisable by persons as busy as Politburo Deputy Member and Gdansk Provincial Committee First Secretary Stanislaw Bejger, Planning Commission First Deputy Chairman Stanislaw Dlugosz, deputy minister at the Maritime Economy Office Ryszard Pospieszynski, Gdansk Governor Mieczyslaw Cygan, and WRN /Provincial People's Council/ Chairman Lech Bednarski. Chiefs of every institution in any way connected with the Gdynia Port were in attendance, plus the 97 delegates, which amounts to virtually all persons elected by their POP's. Among them were many faces I recalled from the past, including Antoni Synoradzki, Stanislaw Kurek, Czeslaw Waniek, and Jozef Latacz, all with three decades of experience as port employees, side by side with numerous young beginners taking their first crack at party activity. A few of the former had just received "Gdansk Area Persons of Merit" letters of appreciation from the KW and KM executive boards, a meager satisfaction after so many years of hard work for the port organization. Let bygones be bygones.

Today the port is operating consistently. According to its director, Hugon Malinowski, himself a port employee with substantial experience, Gdynia Port had just transloaded 7.887 million tons and completed its

annual tasks in the transloading of general cargo, the most difficult freight item. The average pay rose by 22.1 percent, and labor productivity increased 33 percent, so there would be no reason to worry if only some funds could be found in the government's purse to allocate for the necessary overhaul and modernization. Up to now, 860 million zlotys have been spent on indispensable investment and repair, which was all the money the port had at its disposal. Still, it is only a drop in the sea of needs of the depleted maritime sector. There are manpower shortages as well, ranging from 200 to 400 per day in transloading activities. This is so because young adults are in no hurry to get port jobs, it is claimed. This is something those who have worked all their lives in the port are at a loss to understand.

In truth, economic problems were just the backdrop for the conference debate. Were I to use a single sentence to define that debate, I would say that it was a substantive exchange of views dominated by political and ideological problems raised by voices concerned about the party organization's future development and consolidation. This journalist was handed the conference materials by the outgoing factory committee first secretary, Franciszek Rogowski, a man who had led the organization at times of its most trying moments of the past term and struggled to keep up its vigor and identity by every available means.

"These are two sets of materials," he said. "One from the previous conference, the other from the current one. My point is that we speak about our concerns more smoothly these days, using nicely rounded phrases, as it were, so it will not be amiss to recall how these things were handled 3 years back."

He was right. The port POP now has 1,027 comrades, as against 1,460 in April 1981. Many are gone, including quite a number of those who are remembered with no regret at all. Yet there are a good deal of those, too, who are mentioned with a tinge of hope that they would revert to the party which is, after all, their own worker organization. Its core is still composed of workers, 808 comrades. According to Wieslaw Pawlik from POP-3, they were the ones who had built a repair stand for floating craft and they, along with their work companions, perform beyond all those standards and job requirements mentioned by port chief Hugon Malinowski and port worker self-government chairman Tadeusz Wrzochol. The latter's opposition to some of the claims made during the discussion gave witness to the truth that the self-government body is the port's true host.

The Gdynia Port organization is open to local as well as international events, which was well expressed by Aleksander Maczka, a worker and party member, one of those subjected in the past period to attempts to be broken down and morally destroyed. On the conference forum, he delivered a fervent appeal, later approved by conference participants, addressing workers of the world who, he said, are not striving for war and do not imperil us. His appeal centered on the preservation of peace all over the world, so that our land never again would be drenched

with blood from warfare. This was a direct reference to a series of pictures in the photo exhibit showing Gdynia residents during the defense of their city.

As mentioned earlier, the discussion was dominated by comments on ideological and upbringing concerns. W Pawlik from the sailing services department, Wieslaw Gontarski, region III party organization first secretary, Jozef Uszko, region I first secretary, Boleslaw Branka, a long-time party activist, Marek Sarna, and many other conference participants insisted on intensification in the POP's political and upbringing activities, resumption of political and ideological training to enable party members--which was repeatedly emphasized--to marshal a sufficient number of arguments supporting our claims. Wladyslaw Gontarski made a motion for the port committee to establish a Port Center for Ideology and Upbringing. Other speakers insisted on efficient rapid reporting of political information, accessible to rank-and-file activists, so that they do not feel defenseless or weak in the fervent political debates which still continue in work forces at many informal opportunities.

The newly elected KZ is sure to have a major job in accomplishing such tasks, many of which were proposed as formal motions during the meetings. That those motions were dictated by needs was demonstrated by the heated debate during the intermissions in the session in conference halls. The past years of political struggle to win over the workers--perhaps more intense at the port than at other Gdynia industrial plants--have clearly left their mark. It could be sensed that party members had not forgotten those experiences when, at a time of trouble for POP's and a thirst for material and convincing arguments, only too often they were left practically on their own, to rely on nothing but their own political and class instincts. A lesson of this sort is never forgotten. In this author's belief, this is the source of the workers' demand to be given the knowledge enabling them to convince other workers to accept our arguments.

Regardless of key political problems, many speakers in the discussion raised vital concerns of the working people, including housing, welfare and wages. The Gdynia Port and its work force do not differ in this respect from many other enterprises. In Gdynia, too, apartments--nearly 1,300--and improvements in support facilities on the job are sorely needed. Much is being done about it, e.g., two residential complexes are about to be built on Tatrzenska Street, but such attempts appear to be half-hearted. Vice Mayor Franciszek Badowski, representing the city authorities, heard some criticism on this account and, in point of fact, clarified a number of problems. The new KZ will certainly have many issues to handle on behalf of the port work force's interests, accommodated in the conference's final unanimous resolution.

Aside from the public resonance of such issues, the port's work force, always putting in a truly good performance, fully deserves to have its

basic living problems resolved. People in Gdynia are doing much to streamline port activities, e.g., the above-mentioned floating craft repair base, improvements in work organization, and economy measures. According to Zbigniew Kurzycki's interesting comment, one-tenth of 1 percent of cost reduction in port section I, his own work area, represents a profit of 1 million zlotys to the port budget, by no means overabundant, as any comparison of needs and resources can demonstrate.

To sum up the discussion, I will use the statement by Zygmunt Slucki who, speaking with more fervor than many, made numerous valid suggestions addressed to the authorities. "The worse is behind us, the toughest is ahead," he said, referring to the port organization which is facing difficult and complex political tasks.

Many problems of importance for the entire port community were raised. They could serve to compile a list of concerns not only of the party organization but of the work force as a whole. Comments on these problems were made by Stanislaw Dlugosz, who declared extensive help to Gdynia port workers, Governor Cygan, Ryszard Pospieszynski, and other political and administrative officials. Vice-Minister Pospieszynski gave the Gdynia Port trade union chairman a complete report accounting for the ministry's performance in meeting the accords of the well-remembered August. The representatives of the authorities took notes on many motions submitted during the discussion, promising to give exhaustive responses as soon as possible.

S Bejger took a position on the political problems and gave high marks to the conference's level and content. He noted the need to focus the new party authorities' activity on several problems posed as tasks for the KZ: the struggle for the party's leadership role in the port, party influence on task fulfillment, consolidation of the party's leading role among the workers, and also efforts to improve working conditions for the work force.

In attendance were 97 delegates, and just as many ballots were cast in a secret vote to elect new party authorities, including: a 33-person KZ plenum, 9 alternate plenum members, a 9-person party control commission headed by Henryk Borkowski, and a 9-person audit commission chaired by Wieslaw Pawlik. Also, a 13-percent executive board was elected. A young party activist, Leszek Zalach, was elected KZ first secretary.

The conference also elected its delegates to PZPR city conference in Gdynia and to the provincial conference in Gdansk.

Reports-Elections Campaign Comments

Olsztyn GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA in Polish 30 Nov 83 pp 1,2,3

Article by Zbigniew Zemanowicz: "What Is Expected From Us?"

Text What is the POP at OZOS Olsztyn Automobile Tire Plant Stomil really like? This was the question raised, at least indirectly, during the plant's seventh reports-elections conference. The question was mentioned by Włodzimierz Czerwiński, elected KZ first secretary at the previous conference and later supplanted by Jan Minkiewicz and Leonard Kolakowski. A more direct question was also posed:

"Is it true that we are among the most poorly operating party organizations in Olsztyn?"

The issue was taken up by Olsztyn Provincial Committee First Secretary Jan Laskowski. He focused on three elements: "First, there was a point at which the group of activists began to grow, a sign that the OZOS POP was getting ready to work. Second, a measure of party activity is seen in the growth of trade unions. Only about a third of the party members (122 out of 336) are also trade unions members, which is a blemish on our honor. Third, the POP has no influence on managerial groups at the plant. A manager in a socialist country should not be able to hold antisocialist views. On this count, there is an unfinished process at OZOS which cannot be completed realistically without the party."

These considerations led Comrade Laskowski to an expression of his own evaluation: "The party at OZOS is already organized well enough to be able to correct those sectors of activity which are lagging behind. You OZOS party members have accomplished as much as you could, and nobody has the right to disparage that."

From March 1981 to November 1983, OZOS party membership dropped by 225 members and candidates, so that currently there are 336 comrades at the plant. However, a remark about the halting of decline trends injects a note of optimism.

In September 1983, following a 3-year interval, admissions to the PZPR were begun, and five persons became party candidates. Currently, 15 departmental party organizations are active at OZOS. A campaign in those primary cells preceded the factory conference.

Pre-conference discussion was dominated by economic matters, problems relating to working conditions, welfare concerns, and implementation of the principles of social justice. There was no lack, however, of voices emphasizing the weaknesses of intraparty work and ideological upbringing.

Much attention was paid to the effectiveness of party work. Under consideration were methods to be applied under changing sociopolitical

conditions in order to provide actual leadership in enterprises and communities, to assure the party's proper functioning and to inspire and control socioeconomic organizations and economic managers at all levels of management.

Consistency of acts and words in the activities of party members, openness in party life, freedom of criticism and debate, observation of the principle of broad consultation on political decisions and economic--these are the fundamental principles intended to lead to the accomplishment of the presented tasks.

Similar problems were debated during the factory conference. The first speaker, Comrade Baltronowicz, reflected on what to do to achieve proper organization of work at OZOS. He identified two reasons--absenteeism and work force turnover--hindering the achievement of this goal. An experimental wage structure will be set up next year, he said, under which final earnings should be related to effective time on the job and bonuses for seniority. A 50 percent reduction in turnover and absenteeism would permit a 10 percent decrease in employment with unchanged output. A related topic was raised by Henryk Gajdamowoz from a Stomil-supported school. Relatively high Stomil-funded stipends have been offered to students who commit themselves to work at OZOS for as many years as they have received their stipends.

According to the 1983-1985 OZOS POP's program, "ranking issue is the search for increasingly effective form for party work with young people. The methods currently used are inappropriate, dominated by counseling and excessive formalism, yet lacking dialogue and partnership. This experience should be grounds for drawing proper conclusions."

"There are 450 ZSMP members at the OZOS plant," the ZSMP chairman said at the conference. "There were more than 1,000 in our best years. Only 330 remained in December 1982. Thus, in only 1 year, 120 new members were added. Improper attitudes are occasionally taken by department chiefs dealing with youth organization representatives. Some chiefs are helpful (e.g., in the fire department and industrial security service), but there are others who say: 'The boy scouts are here again, I wonder what they want this time around?'"

Young adults' concerns also included issues pertaining to OZOS-financed construction. There was even a suggestion to create the factory's own housing cooperative.

Mieczyslaw Jesionowski asked what was expected from us, a question which is rhetorical only on the surface. "More than anything else, justice, order, discipline and sound management are expected, while we do not have sufficient internal controls," he concluded and went on to propose the establishment of the plant's own inner monitoring chamber to watch over the costs, which are a virtual unknown to many persons.

The conference elected a new KZ composed of 23 comrades, with Leonard Kolakowski as its first secretary. Jozef Gutt was elected chairman of the plant's 9-man audit commission. The OZOS party community will be represented at the city conference by Jerzy Chenkowski, Zenon Giranowski, Jozef Gutt, Kazimierz Jakubiak, Kazimierz Jaworski, Leonard Kolakowski, Boleslaw Konieczko, Wlodzimierz Paetzold, Wojciech Sadowski, and Czeslaw Turowski.

A report on the activities during the concluding term was presented in a 90-page pamphlet. There were 30 pages devoted to the program of action, and the conference itself continued from 9 am to 6 pm. In view of this, it is impossible to review all the issues and to outline all of the statements made, of which this reporter is fully aware. One topic, however, cannot be left unmentioned. OZOS Stomil is the largest industrial plant in Olsztyn Province. Its output is eagerly awaited by farmers all over Poland. The OZOS plan of action could not have omitted a reference to these concerns.

The output of OZOS dropped to its lowest in 1982, reaching only 67.3 of its production capacity in tires. These figures make the plant's tasks for the next few years quite obvious. In 1984, output should reach 2.4 million tires, or 92.3 percent capacity, and in 1985, 2.6 million tires, a level equal to the plant's production potential. This gives rise to other more specific tasks, but their overriding objective is the same. Next year, construction will begin on the first stage of OZOS III.

Even though this was a party conference rather than a production performance assessment session, production issues were by no means left out.

Regardless of the high marks given the gmina-city party organization, its top echelon, and its executive board and secretariat by the Olsztyn KW and expressed on behalf of its executive board by WKKP /provincial party control commission/ chairman Mieczyslaw Kubicki, there is no lack of weak spots in rural areas and in the city itself. Commenting about them during the discussion, KW executive board member Edmund Michalski from the Lubawa state farm asserted that the revitalization of these organizations calls for input from the strongest element in the many robust POP's. The weaker ones are in need of assistance, support and stimulation from without.

Others elaborated on this thought, including educator Maksymilian Pszczolinski who, as a POP first secretary for many years, emphasized the importance of meetings.

"Meetings must be held regularly. Party members should meet at least once a month to discuss key problems of their communities when these problems have currency. They should take positions on these problems. Where this does not happen, incentives should be provided."

"We must stop the fairly frequent practice of inattention to POP Secretaries in their daily work. Outsiders who visit the factory in connection with economic matters generally talk with the managerial personnel and show no interest in PZPR secretaries and party work. A secretary should also be paid a visit and should accompany the visitor when meeting other people." This comment by Jozef Zuralski, OSM first secretary, was aimed not only at economic and administrative management but at the press as well. While admitting our culpability on behalf of my media colleagues, I hasten to note that our own POP has adopted an appropriate resolution on this issue.

KMG /city-gmina committee/ First Secretary Henryk Heyda presented membership changes in the party in a report and a paper on the Lubawa PZPR organization's activities from May 1981 through November 1983. It is a fact that such turnover must exist. Yet does it have to lead to decline in membership, as it did in Lubawa, from 1,241 PZPR members and candidate members in late 1980 to 1,026 at this time? Many comrades have changed jobs and addresses. Many others departed because of indifference or improper attitudes. They were weakening the party, but their places should be taken up by others with active attitudes and a vision that extends beyond their own interests. There is no lack of such people. They should be attracted to the party and won over to take part in its activities.

"We want to organize open meetings in the rural areas, hoping that they will help influence rural communities and increase our ranks," mused Jozef Szymanski from Targowisko, a highly productive village not only by local standards. "But we must be assisted by the comrades from the KMG in the organization and conduct of such meetings," he concluded.

The party's strength and impact were extensively discussed at the conference. The consensus was that the degree of direct involvement of activists and other members in the major problems of everyday living was the key. Familiarity with the principles of economic reform is not widespread yet, due to neglect on the part of managers and POP executive boards. Work forces perform well in those locations where those principles were spelled out to every person in a plant. Examples were cited, including that of the Lubawa Technical Confectionery Plant, now ranking among the province's top-performing enterprises. Another example was Elpan, in which the party's involvement in setting work and human relations straight changed many things for the better.

"However, are those crazy prices supposed to become the economic rule and an avenue to economic stabilization?" MG /city-gmina/ PRON chairman Roman Czerepinski wondered. "Can the party be indifferent to this?" At this point, he offered a shocking example of the educational department's order of 5 doors which were priced at 200,000 zlotys in a certain plant. The invoice included labor cost at 900 zlotys per hour, whereas the plant's workers were paid 45 zlotys an hour, or 20 times less. A conference participant said: "If party people want to

fight for ideology and politics, they must first eliminate the most glaring improprieties and sources of suffering. They must not yield to a sense of helplessness, especially when what they want is within reach. But it takes a lot of will."

Admittedly, the discussion was incisive and abounded in criticism. I found this somewhat surprising because the results posted by the communities of the city and the gmina rank among the highest in the province. The comrades from Lubawa view their achievements realistically. For instance, in the discussion a comment was made about the lack of water in Byszwald having been caused by some builders of water mains who had abandoned their job. Another resident of Byszwald village set the record straight:

"When construction of the water mains was heavily promoted, the residents refused to work on it. Now they are to suffer--but who is to blame, some elves or themselves?"

Gmina chief Jan Nesterowicz complained about Lubawa villages, until recently a leader, having lost their former ranking. A census of pig herds last June demonstrated a major decline in the number of animals to levels recorded a decade ago! This applies to porkers as well as stud animals. Grain yields are equal to the province's averages, nothing to boast about. The composition of plantings has deteriorated, now including a larger share of less intensive varieties. Mineral fertilizer use declined by 21 kilograms of NPK per hectare in comparison with the 1978 levels. Things have begun to change since the fall. Farmers have purchased 6 percent more basic fertilizer (phosphorus and potassium based) than they did a year before. They are the province's undisputed leaders in the use of fertilizer lime. The PFZ /State Land Fund/ surface area decreased from 1,006 hectares in 1982 to 490 hectares in 1983, with no land left unused. Lowest quality plots and those most advantageously located are utilized under lease contracts.

Comrade Nesterowicz noted that no effects of the crisis were felt in many cases. Investment advances are visible in both rural and urban areas. Although the needs still surpass them, much has been done and much is being done.

Out of the 100 elected delegates of POP's, 89 attended the conference, 4 persons excused their absences, and the remaining 7 will see that their POP's receive notifications dealing with this matter. The floor was taken, in some cases repeatedly, by Bernard Teclaw, Wincenty Szarmach, Regina Krzemien, Edward Szymanski, Barbara Zdunek, Jan Nesterowicz, Aleksander Mejka, ZSL MGK chairman Ignacy Wazejewski, Jan Nowakowski, Roman Czerepinski, Edmung Michalski, Edward Pokojski, Maksymilian Pszczolinski, Antoni Gajewski, Andrzej Chylinski, Jozef Szymanski, Jozef Zuralski, and Wldayslaw Orzol.

Closing the session, Olsztyn WKKP chairman Mieczyslaw Kubicki concluded: "Today's conference has ended a period in which even routine party tasks were difficult to complete. We have been through the worse of times. Even greater challenges are ahead. Party struggle continues on many levels, against internal and external enemies. Yet the party has enough strength and enough core personnel as well as public support to cope with these difficulties."

The conferees elected a 33-person city committee, an executive board, statute commissions, and delegates to the PZPR provincial conference. Henryk Heyda was reelected first secretary. Bernard Teclaw and Marian Knozinski became salaried secretaries and Edmund Michalski a non-salaried one. The following comrades were elected as delegates to the provincial conference: Antoni Szypczynski, Jan Nesterowicz, Bernard Teclar, Jerzy Stefaniak, Henryk Czudec, Jan Hoffman, Jozef Goliaszewski, and Jozef Babski.

A combined city-gmina PZPR conference on 26 November 1983 in Sepopol was attended by 85 delegates and many invited guests. The conference opened on a pleasant note with a presentation of decorations to noted activists: Witold Baczewski, Cavalier's Cross of the Order of Poland's Restoration; Jan Mankut and Jan Sloniec, Silver Crosses of Merit; and Anna Pajak and Tadeusz Rybicki, badges of "Meritorious of Ermland and Mazuria."

Party cards were presented to 9 PZPR candidates. A report on behalf of the former POP committee was read by First Secretary Antoni Figurowicz. Here is a selection of data and findings offered in the report:

The Sepopol party organization is composed of 28 POP units and 1 factory committee. It numbers 690 members and candidate members, of which 52 percent are workers, 20 percent farmers, and 27 percent white-collar employees. During the reporting period, 115 members were removed from the rolls or expelled. Twenty new candidates were accepted.

The organization's elections campaign proceeded smoothly, with only two POP's having been forced to hold repeat meetings due to low attendance. Average attendance at elections-reports meetings was 70 percent.

Most POP's function well. Seven, however, should be rated as weak. They fail to hold regular meetings and have problems with dues collection.

The city-gmina committee valued contacts with the public. During the period under review, 220 applicants were received on various personal and societal concerns.

Party indoctrination was poorly conducted, especially in the smaller POP's and in rural locations.

Nine of the motions from the previous campaign, chiefly concerning investment were not implemented.

City-gmina office chief Fryderyk Kupis provided interesting information on the performance on economic and educational-cultural tasks as well as on plans for the near term. While in 1981 2,472 tons of grain were procured from all of the gmina's suppliers, the figure for 1983 is 13,285 tons, five times as much. This is proof of major advances in Sepopol farming, especially in state farms. On the other hand, a decline was noted in livestock raising by 14 percent in cattle (35 percent in state farms), by 3 percent in hogs, and by 14 percent in sheep. Land reclamation proceeded smoothly. Supplies of replacement parts for farm machinery and fertilizer lime are inadequate. By 1985, 400 hectares of the PFZ will be developed.

The gmina's industrial plants, Poligrafika and a rettery, operate successfully. A fine house of culture can accommodate a broader range of cultural activities.

The chairmen of the audit commission and party control commission submitted their reports. Secretary Jan Malinowski expressed the PZPR provincial committee's assessment of the city-gmina committee's performance.

The overall grade is good. The city-gmina committee held regular meetings, a total of 16, while the executive board had 45 meetings. The city-gmina echelon took a very serious approach to the implementation of resolutions made by the central committee, provincial committee, and their own committee. Collaboration with the ZSL and all societal organizations was good.

ZSL City-Gmina committee Secretary Boguslaw Brejwo took the floor as the first speaker in the discussion, commenting on collaboration in the implementing of the agricultural program. He also conveyed a salutation from farmers to the delegates. Henryk Zakrzewski, a farmer from Rusajny, stipulated repairs of the Rusajny-Smolanka road section and lighting in his village.

Roman Rzepecki, a young farmer from Lipica, felt it was necessary for PKS /State Motor Transport/ buses to reach his village on Saturdays and Sundays as well. It was a good routine to deliver sugar allocated to farm producers directly to village stores. Now they are forced to use their own transportation and drive to Sepopol to pick it up. On party matters, R. Rzepecki noted that older party members occasionally failed to see the young ones as equal partners.

Wladyslaw Miedziocha, a farmer from Sepopol, noted that services to farmers should be developed.

PZPR Central Committee member Kazimierz Duded, a farmer from Lipica, offered his observations on the work of the worker-farmer-military, as he put it, Central Committee. Central Committee sessions are prepared collectively. Sharp debate is frequently conducted within subcommittees. There is no shunning of difficult decisions if they are necessary, he said.

The PZPR Central Committee member gave high marks to local achievements of Sepopol farmers and noted the need to open culture centers and club cafeterias, eliminated in recent years in rural areas. A portion of GS /gmina cooperative/ profits should be assigned for this purpose.

Jan Latoch, a delegate from Sepopol, noted housing problems in the town. "Some tenants occupy dwellings unfit for chickens. Old buildings are falling apart, and repairs are sloppy. My apartment has been under repair for 3 years. Materials have been used to fix other apartments rather than mine."

Director of gmina schools and KW executive board member Boguslaw Malysz outlined the very difficult situation of preschools. A preschool for Sepopol will be built as a volunteer community effort next year, he said, calling upon all interested parties to support this venture financially.

There are problems with school buildings and a shortage of housing for teachers. Because of many teachers' intention to retire, unavailability of apartments for new personnel may result in declining levels of instruction.

Comments by a well-known activist, retired farmer Kluziak, were followed with interest: "Many people clamor about the crisis and poverty. There is no poverty, if only people stop whining about it. Have we forgotten the conditions we were in in the immediate postwar years? It is far from bad now, when bread and meat are around. We should never break down, just work harder, and everthing will be available."

In the second portion of his comments, KW Secretary Jan Malinowski explained in detail the justification for changes in the prices of foodstuffs, profitability of hog raising, and the housing situation in Olsztyn Province.

The Sepopol conference elected a 25-person city-gmina committee, with Antoni Figurowicz reelected first secretary. Eleven persons were elected to the party audit commission, chaired by Jan Mankit, and 13 members were elected to the party control commission, chaired by Aleksander Kondraczuk, also reelected. Five delegates to the provincial conference were also elected.

The conference adopted a draft program of activities during the next term. It contains 32 motions for implementation. The new elected KMG was authorized to produce a final version of this program.

Activity in Resolving Community Problems

Zielona Gora GAZETA LUBUSKA in Polish 30 Nov 83 pp 1,4

/Article by ZG: "Conferences at PZPR Field Echelons. Keeness in Solving Community Problems"/

/Text/ Successive PZPR conferences are held in field echelons, discussing for the most part intraparty problems, the economy, ideology and upbringing. With the elimination of local barriers to development as the chief topic, specific proposals are being offered for economic improvement.

Delegates were in session in Brzesnica, Siedlisko, Swidnica, and Siedlca last Monday. On Tuesday, a conference attended by PZPR KW First Secretary Jerzy Dabrowski was held in Slawa. The PZPR echelon of Zielona Gora gmina was also in session.

The city-gmina conference in Jasien was dominated by farming and community utilities problems. Land reclamation work done in the Guzow-Wicina-Roztoki pasture area was severely criticized. It was suggested that gas deliveries could be provided to several villages adjacent to the gas mainline pipe. As a follow-up on the position taken by a number of POP's, another motion was made to establish an independent unit handling the city's community utilities and residential concerns.

The delegates elected a 27-person gmina-city committee, an audit commission and a party control commission. Elected as delegates to the PZPR provincial conference were ROPP /regional party work center/ manager from Lubsko Pawel Buzantowicz; a farmer from Juzyn, Czeslaw Gawron; and Jerzy Wybranski, reelected KMG first secretary. PZPR Provincial Committee First Secretary Zygmunt Stabrowski took part in the debate.

At Trzebiechow, discussions at the conference focussed on intraparty problems, improvement in party training and political work, and expansion of ideological and upbringing activities with youth. Waldemar Brzostowski was reelected first secretary of the gmina committee, and the vice principal of the Combined Gmina School, Boleslaw Dziuk, was elected a delegate to the province-level conference.

Jacek Wieczorkowski was elected first secretary by the city-gmina conference at Kozuchow, along with its delegates to the provincial conference: PSS /consumer cooperative/ chairman Ryszard Bambrowicz; Kazimierz Bednarczyk, retiree; Michal Dowkan, RPM deputy director; Edmund Fuglewicz, a Polmo employee; Jozef Oldziejewski, state farm director; Jerzy Pawlik, second secretary of the PZPR KMG; Ryszard Pokorny, RPM employee; and Henryk Zielinski, a clerical worker from Polmo.

Main topics raised in the discussion were housing construction, preservation of older dwellings, needs of the communal utilities sector, and supply shortages. The comrades offered a number of specific motions and proposals concerning improvement in the residents' standard of living. Much attention was focused on political work with youth and collaboration with trade unions and societal organizations.

Because of an error on the part of persons providing this information, our report on the PZPR conference at Sulechow was inexact. The KMG executive board includes 13 rather than 15 persons, and the name of Comrade Marian Jaworski is not on the list of delegates to the provincial conference, where it was placed by mistake.

8795

CSO: 2600/402

RAKOWSKI ADDRESSES GDANSK PARTY ORGANIZATION

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 294, 12 Dec 83 p 4

[Speech by Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski at the Gdansk Shipyard: "The Party is the Only Force Able to Fulfill the Aspirations of the Working Class"]

[Text] The first secretary of the Central Committee, chairman of the Council of Ministers, comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, whom you invited to today's meeting, asked me to give you his warm and sincere wishes. The Politburo, which at its meeting on 6 December, on the motion of comrade Bejger, authorized me to take part in your conference, hopes that you will approve a program of action which will strengthen the moral and political position of the party among the shipyard workers.

The reports-elections meeting of your organization is an opportunity to sum up achievements, take a look at weaknesses and setbacks, and prepare a list of matters and problems which will have to be dealt with in the coming months and years.

The party organization in the V. I. Lenin Shipyard has experienced difficult times in the past 3 years, and many dramatic events have taken place. Probably there were more days that were difficult rather than easy, and more troubles than facts and events which would give rise to satisfaction. Every party organization has its specificity; the specificity of your experiences is that here, in the shipyard, you very acutely endured everything that the entire party had to cope with in the past 3 years.

In a few days it will be 2 years since the Council of Ministers made the dramatic but necessary decision to declare martial law in our country. By no means can this anniversary be ignored--particularly here, in Gdansk. Our enemies, both here and abroad, are still trying to prove that the imposition of martial law dashed the hopes of Poles for democratization, that it made of Poland a country which has entered into a period of long-range economic stagnation and political torpor. The enemies are doing everything they can to make 13 December 1981 a hateful day for Poles. These attempts are unsuccessful. Today millions of Poles are more clearly and vividly convinced that 13 December 1981 is a day on which an act of historical dimensions occurred. On this memorable day the Polish People's Army, supported by the law and order forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and with the support of millions of people with

a sense of responsibility for the fate of an independent and sovereign Poland, saved the country, prevented disturbance to peaceful European stabilization, and made it possible to put a program of socialist renewal into effect. And even though it may differ in many matters, that is how the majority of our society now sees this difficult decision, and that is how history will judge it. In view of the values that are most sacred to our nation, we do not have to be ashamed of that date. It is not hard to reply to the question of where the Polish nation would be today if on the night of 12-13 December the activities of the forces which crumbled the foundations of the Polish state had not been brought to a halt.

So let all of those who made this necessary, whose who in 1981 revived the specter of anarchy and lawlessness, be ashamed--those who here in Gdansk, in the "Oliwa" hall, made the provocative appeal to the nations of Eastern Europe, thus giving irrefutable proof of reckless behavior and ordinary stupidity. And these people wanted to rule Poland!

Let all of those be ashamed who even today are attempting to justify the erst-while destructive activity of the extremists by calling for a rightful and warranted protest by the working class. That which happened in Poland in the summer and fall of 1981 had little in common with a workers' protest--the director's baton was taken over by people who felt that the time had come for the fall of socialism in Poland to begin. That is the truth and the truth will prevail.

Let those be ashamed who fell to their knees, literally and figuratively, before the troublemakers, to whom nothing was more important than the destruction of the historical achievements of People's Poland--those who were blind to the approaching fratricidal conflict, to the cold and hunger of the oncoming winter which threatened national existence.

Let those be ashamed who in the first days of martial law called for active resistance. The victims of martial law rest on their conscience.

Let those be ashamed who in 1982 and 1983 called for street demonstrations and encouraged Polish youth to reach for stones, who gave moral support to the troublemakers.

Let those be ashamed who after futile attempts to draw the working class into the streets of our cities are now cloaking themselves in garments of sages and strategists and recommending a peaceful--in quotation marks--long-range struggle with People's Poland.

Finally, let all of those be ashamed who have made a good thing for themselves out of Poland's misfortune and, shedding the remnants of national pride--although mouthing patriotic platitudes--are reaching out for the packages sent with compassion and the dollar aid so generously granted, in return for appeals for arousal of dissatisfaction in Poland, for the sowing of distrust and pessimism, for the production of leaflets and pseudo-programs of dubious quality. This is not new, for after all, this is not the first time in the history of our nation that petty, prosaic, personal ambitions and interests of some people take precedence over concern for the fatherland and its fate and position in the world.

We do not have to be ashamed of 13 December. On that date progress towards a crisis-free Poland was started. Only a rabid and blindly prejudiced enemy can argue that during the past 2 years no socioeconomic problem was solved.

On that day and every day following, millions of people in Poland, the majority of the working people, were able to sleep peacefully.

The time of anxiety and uncertainty, the fears of millions of wives and mothers about the fate of their dearest ones, had ended. After 13 December it was possible to produce material goods calmly and productively, both in the cities and in the countryside. Tranquility returned to millions of Polish homes. That is what is important in the national consciousness.

Neither the teamed-up politicians or their moral and political patrons from across the ocean or from London, Paris or Bonn, are able to disturb this calm. These people are conducting a futile battle against socialism and its advocates. Because what does a working person in our country want? He wants tranquil days, months and years--the hope that the time will come when he can make ends meet and the purchase of shoes for his child is no longer a problem. The working people want social justice. They want to feel that the country is developing and that they will have a growing influence on everything that is happening and concerns them and their fate. Those are the everyday matters and expectations of Poles. The party has no other goal than to make it possible for these expectations to be fulfilled. All of the working people who are demonstrating their support for the party's economic and social policy and the people's authority by performing their civic and occupational duties with integrity must be regarded with great respect. It is they, together with us, who are creating the hope for a better tomorrow. By joint action, based on mutual confidence, we can intensify these hopes. Without hope, life becomes unbearable.

On 13 December 1981 the dreams of the imperialists and enemies of socialism about a divided and bloody Poland were shattered. Also shattered were the plans of those who dreamed of a European Lebanon between the Bug and Vistula [Rivers], except on a larger scale and with results much more dangerous to European and world peace. It would be interesting to know how many American cruisers would want to enter the Baltic [Sea] and perhaps even close to Westerplatte, and how many times a day Radio Free Europe and other Polish-language radio stations would broadcast the well-known hymn "with the smoke of fires, with the dust of fraternal blood."

The shipyard's party organization consisting of workers, technicians, engineers and administrative personnel has gone through much that has been difficult, painful and sometimes even dramatic. Not all of the party members who in September 1980 endorsed the slogan "socialism yes, distortions no" are here with you today. Some left because they despaired of our ideas, others, like sheep, followed the herd, and still others did not withstand the moral terror inflicted upon them by those and others like them whom we saw in this hall late last August. Others who left the party included those who saw in "Solidarity" and in the aggressive, destructive actions of many of the leaders of this organization a new, causative force. The careerists and perhaps even the rascals also left us.

We are not sorry that they left, nor will we open the door to the party for them again, although some of them certainly regret that they changed from one train to another too soon. Anyway, this applies not only to the shipyard workers.

However, we should not stop trying to regain for socialism those workers who under difficult and dramatic circumstances despaired and fell victim to their emotions. We should not nurture an antipathy to them, to the hardworking people who are still standing on the sidelines and are distrustful and embittered. The workers class is and will remain the main force in our society. It is its dreams and desires which will determine the goals which the Polish United Workers Party sets for the nation. Our party grew out of the strivings of the working class and despite the errors it committed it remains the only force able to fulfill its aspirations.

Giving these aspirations specific program forms, the predecessor of the PZPR, the Polish Workers Party, put the Polish nation on the road to revolutionary changes. Under the leadership of the Polish Workers Party and the Polish United Workers Party Poland became an industrial-agricultural state. The socialist revolution brought advances to millions of people and created permanent foundations on which today's working class is now growing. In more than one workplace, even here in the shipyard, workforces are divided and sometimes even in conflict with one another. This is so primarily because there are still false prophets and false friends of the working class among the workforces. It is they who are appealing to the workers to work at a snail's pace, to ignore their duties, and to lower quality. It is they who are encouraging people to criticize, to make unrealistic demands. They see a way out of present problems and difficulties not by honest work but by sowing discontent and expectations of a political division in the union movement. What they want, therefore, is a divided working class, with one group set against the other.

Those among your work colleagues who yield to such "good" advice primarily do harm to themselves and their families. To stand on the sidelines and wait for miracles can only delay the elimination of the social and economic causes which caused the acute drop in the standard of living of millions of working people, and set Poland far behind in European statistics. How long we will remain there as a nation and state will be determined by the collective effort of Poles, the collective political wisdom of the nation. Certainly we are able to make a much greater effort, and our reserves are still enormous.

Our party, its Central Committee, faithful to the line established for it at the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress, pays close attention to the opinions expressed by the workers and draws conclusions from these opinions for its everyday activity, outlining tasks for the state administration. It wants to assure its comrades that the leadership of the party and the government does not ignore the criticisms of the working people, criticisms which flow out of the concern for public and private welfare. We also know about all of the troubles of everyday living and their influence on the moods and attitudes of the millions of working people. We know what troubles the people, what pains them. But not everything can be done all at once. Nor does everything depend only on the party and government leadership. After all, the government is also

hundreds of thousands of managers and directors, and for the average citizen, it is also every official or the proverbial girl at the window. Is everyone respecting the dignity, time and patience of the working people, the worker and the farmer? The answer is obvious. It is far from everyone. We talked about these negatives aspects very loudly at the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Plenums of the Central Committee. I would also like to add that we know our own weaknesses and lack of resourcefulness. We see the harmful effects of the arrogance of the authorities. We oppose the tendency to look at everything in terms of statistics, to react to all kinds of troubles according to the rule that "we know better."

Step by step we will remove the evil from our daily life which has sometimes accumulated through the years and has often become routine, something normal to which we have become indifferent. But we will not make any deals with mean-spiritedness and bureaucratism, with people who know it all and are standing on the sidelines and are waiting for the appearance of a miracle-worker. That is what those are doing and still stubbornly repeating who here, in the shipyard, on 11 and 12 December 1981 called for all-out opposition to a socialist state. Let us add that in their rankling dislike, and maybe even hatred, of socialism, they are forgetting that martial law saved the lives of many of them.

There are many more difficult matters in our fatherland that are awaiting favorable solutions for the working people. There is still a lot of cold indifference and thoughtlessness, and sometimes there is even ordinary stupidity. But these scourges will not be eliminated by talking nonsense about some kind of separate elements or producing grandiloquent declarations written in Warsaw and announced here in Gdansk and then disseminated by Radio Free Europe. We can eliminate these scourges, or effectively reduce their scope, by creating a universal, joint front of public activeness.

Our party has a determining role in the creation of such a front. You, comrades, must be the active generators of a climate of encouragement for those who are now standing on the sidelines, a climate in which they will abandon this unproductive stance.

The collective wisdom of nations is revealed also in an interest in its past and its future, and in the drawing of the correct conclusions from experience. The history of People's Poland has recorded in the memory of the nation not only achievements of historical significance, thousands of facts and positive events, but also those experiences which were extremely painful and dramatic beyond description. They include the events which took place in December 1970 on the Polish Coast, and also here--in Gdansk. We have not forgotten these tragic days nor are we doing anything which would indicate an attempt to diminish the dimensions of the tragedy that occurred then. Our party in a report on the work of the commission appointed by the Central Committee to elucidate the causes and the details of the social conflicts in the history of People's Poland courageously and unequivocally assessed the December tragedy. We are very severe judges of ourselves, but we also know that in the long and complicated history of mankind there were also dramatic events which no one wanted or strived for. Everyone who knows even a little history knows this.

In deference to human misfortune we firmly oppose the exploitation of this painful anniversary to inflame and divide the nation, to incite unrest and opposition to authority. The sowers of unrest, the organizers of last year's demonstrations and street riots, the members of the so-called Temporary Coordinating Commission (Solidarity underground), through Radio Free Europe, for several days have been appealing to the workers to observe the tragic anniversary by going out into the streets. The shadows of the former activists of "Solidarity", wandering around in the underground, and their bosses who live among us, are deliberately and, we should say, cynically, treating this tragic anniversary as an occasion to remind us of them. They want to convince themselves and their compatriots that they are still important and to give the imperialists the argument that Poland is still a country that is disturbed and in conflict. To make political capital out of the December tragedy is an unworthy act. Playing political games under the monument to the fallen dockworkers is highly immoral and unethical.

Poland needs calm and respect for law and order, and not street riots. Let us say candidly: We need constructive activity and thought for the future, and not constant meetings at cemeteries and monuments. We show respect for these places and we remember them. We do not erase them from the national consciousness, but those who do everything in their power to make turmoil where quiet and solemnity should be maintained do a disservice to the nation. We must express regret that among them are also those who consider themselves to be the conscience of the nation and the watchdogs of morality.

Our nation during the past 3 years learned about the laws of social development--it collected experiences at a very fast rate. We believe that most of the people learned from these years, and that thanks to the lessons they learned the appeals and calls to transform the pre-holiday December days into days of unrest and instigation will go unheeded.

/Let me express the belief that the shipyard party organization will overcome its well-known weaknesses and with redoubled energy will carry on its difficult and arduous struggle for confidence in the party and its programs. Here, in the shipyard, every hour and every day.

Your organization now has almost 2,000 members. This is a considerable number. Your most ambitious goal--if I may so advise you--should be to constantly strive to attain in the shipyard a political and production status which would make your plant the symbol of well-organized, productive work for Poland/ [in boldface].

9295
CSO: 2600/579

PARTY CRITICISM EVOKES POLEMIC

Socialism Matter of Class Struggle

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 15 Sep 83 p 4

[Article by Col Prof Jerzy Muszynski: "The Difficult Problems of Our Development"]

[Text] The political events of recent years still arouse lively interest and evoke social emotions, since they constitute one of the more difficult periods in our postwar history. It was a period in which the threats to the foundations of the socialist order became quite real. They have already been eliminated to a considerable extent through the stabilizing actions of the government during the period of martial law and after it was lifted, through the strengthening of the party, and also through increased efficiency in the functioning of the state and economic administration.

The assessment of our country's present situation is the subject of numerous publications in the press, on the radio and television; it is on the agenda for the proceedings of various bodies, party echelons, the state administration, and also many social committees and councils. This gives a certain approximate picture of reality, although these assessments still evoke many doubts, since they are frequently overloaded with excessively emotional feelings. Many such assessments are carried by certain weeklies, and their authors often do not succeed in getting the most important things, literally tearing things apart where the situations have already been clarified, or looking for problems where they do not exist. All of them are obviously using different arguments for the theses voiced by them, repeatedly citing the classics of Marxism, rulings by party echelons, etc. Various tendentiously selected quotations are frequently cited. It is possible to agree in part with many opinions; others cannot be accepted. These views often contain both demagoguery and personal frustration, and frequently also unsatisfied ambitions.

Some of the abovementioned views arouse particular doubts, and thus it is difficult to overlook them. These views manifest both a failure to understand the essence of the matter, and also a lack of a sense of responsibility in making accusations that are predominantly rumored, ungrounded and consequently unconstructive.

In assessing the present situation of our country, it is clearly not a matter of just taking a photograph that faithfully reflects the economic, social, political and ideological reality, but also of providing answers on the subject of the sources and determining factors of the existing state of affairs, and the courses and methods for further action aimed at restoring socialist ideology's natural luster, and society's faith in the possibility of this ideology's being realized in the system.

Only a calm and objective examination of our present situation allows perceiving its earlier determining factors, and makes it possible to create future visions of our development. Currently neither retrospection nor the prospects appear unambiguous in social opinion. Nevertheless, the basic components can now already be seen clearly. They are furthermore the significant bases taken into account that were cited--before martial law--by the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress, and in implementing its decrees after the lifting of martial law, by the 12th Plenum of the Central Committee, which adopted a document from the commission for establishing the sources and determining factors of the socio-political conflicts. Also developed were the targets for the further planned development of our country, taking into account the most urgent tasks for the years 1983-1985, and later the ones for the years 1986-1990. One may consequently evaluate both the past and the future more realistically and more calmly.

In our political and economic publications, there is a fairly strong tendency to portray the future in dark colors. Its crowning argument is the thesis that breakdowns occurred in our country at certain times, economic crises appeared, and sociopolitical conflicts occurred; that these crises affected both the party and the state apparatus, the organs of the government and the administration; and that society often turned away from its government. Certain people confusingly interpret this breakdown as a result of the unsuitability of the systemic assumptions to our Polish conditions or, finally, their foreignness to our national identity. The spokesmen for these views assert that no remedial measures will lead to synchronization of the universal prerequisites for the creation of socialism with our specific Polish characteristics, and that crises and conflicts are an inevitable feature of our life and that in connection with this it is necessary to search for new systemic concepts for the country.

There are great divergences in assessing the sources and determining factors of the failures on the road of the transition from capitalism to socialism. None of the numerous views expressed from a position of pessimism, however, is in agreement with reality, since they take into account only one of the aspects of this complicated mechanism. Getting rid of all prejudices and personal sensibilities, one should view these failures in the context of the exceptional complexity of the revolutionary process in our country, the determining factors for which are both internal and external.

The road to socialism is not simple and easy for all countries in which anti-capitalist revolutions take place. After all, this is not the same road for everyone. Its diversity is caused precisely by the specific features of individual countries. Each country and each people creates a new socioeconomic

and political order relative to universal principles, and at the same time in accordance with its own needs and capabilities. Harmonizing universal principles with national characteristics is not an easy undertaking, but also there can be no successes or social satisfaction without achieving it.

The "Achilles heel" of our socialist revolution is the fact that these necessary correlations of universal principles and national characteristics have not been achieved, or have sometimes been violated. The concepts for creating socialism in Poland were based either on distortions of the dogmatist-sectarian type (until 1956) or on more or less extensive voluntaristic inclinations appearing primarily in a failure to take into account the realities of the country, and the needs and capabilities of society. An example of this was the practices from the years 1948-1956, from 1964-1970, and in the second half of the 1970's. The unsatisfied needs of society caused its embitterment, dissatisfaction, and protests. Above all, there was a lack of mechanisms relaying the voice of authentic social opinion. This entailed a disruption of the class ties between the leadership and the masses, and this led--sooner or later--straight to conflict. And this is probably the most fundamental internal determining factor in our breakdowns and failures on the road to creating a basis for socialism. Meanwhile, another fundamental source is the failure to take into account the capabilities of the country, the needs of society, and its ideological-political differentiation in programming the tasks in individual sectors of our development path, overlooking failures, not enforcing the responsibility of people occupying management posts in the party and state apparatus for obvious faults, abuses, or not fulfilling their obligations.

Our failures have also been influenced by external determining factors, and particularly concrete phenomena in the conflict between systems. This problem cannot be taken lightly, although the tendency to ignore international factors is fairly widespread among us. At the same time, the so-called outstripping strategy carried out by the West since the mid-1960's, aimed at increasing the distance in development between capitalism and socialism, had a negative effect on our completion of economic tasks both through a corresponding credit policy and through technology transfer.

The Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress, assessing the situation after August, stated in its resolution: "The present crisis resulted from both the effect of defective mechanisms in the party, state and society, and the mistakes and faults of the people exercising authority." The analysis of these sources and determining factors of the crisis was substantive and concrete. At the same time, the congress warned that in assessing the past, one should not lack an honest attitude toward the real and unquestioned achievements of the People's Republic of Poland. "In a relatively short historical period," the resolution states, "we raised the country from ruin and backwardness. Poland became an industrially developed country. Among other things, the living conditions of the rural population were fundamentally changed as a result of the agricultural reform. In spite of the present difficulties, the social situation, society's level of education and culture, is different, and there has been an increase in its feeling of worth and its awareness of its civic right to joint management of state and local affairs."

Let us thus emphasize the following: regardless of the breakdowns, failures, conflicts and crises, the results of the Polish socialist revolution are both evident and lasting. They cover the reconstruction of all areas of life on the basis of socialist principles, create important elements of the foundations of socialism, and constitute a basis for further systemic transformations. Some of these elements have been damaged and chipped by defective guiding mechanisms, by the crisis, and by the activity of the enemies of socialism; they have not been destroyed, however. Our needs require removal of the obstacles still remaining and the outlining of a proper and possible path to socialism that is realistic for our country.

One of our central problems is the issue of political guidance of the state, the issue of the party. There is nothing surprising in this, since the party has gone through the most serious shock in its entire history. It was exposed to a very severe test. It is slowly emerging from all of these oppressions onto a clear path; it is exercising its leadership in society more and more perceptibly; and it is carrying out management in the state more and more consistently. The processes of the consolidation of the party are continuing. Party organizations are becoming more active in plants, state institutions, and in scientific, educational and cultural establishments. The level of party publicity is rising, the ideological front is becoming more active, and scientific research in the sphere of the theory of Marxism-Leninism is laboriously coming to the fore.

It is on this basis that the next reflection suggests itself; it has to do with the assessment of the party, its managing echelons, and the full-time, cadre party apparatus. Excessively harsh assessments occur in the press, which is to some extent justified with regard to the pre-August period. In the 1970's there was a certain distortion of cadre policy, including also the policy for the full-time party apparatus. This state of affairs was subjected to harsh criticism at the Ninth Party Congress. Since that congress, however, fundamental and beneficial changes have occurred in the party apparatus, and every reasonable person who evaluates reality according to objective criteria would perceive this.

Before the Ninth Congress there were also people who were ideologically involved, genuine social activists, derived from the working class, the peasants, and the working intelligentsia, dedicated and industrious. The congress appreciated the significance of the party apparatus, as was expressed in the resolution and in the new Party Statute. In section 45 of the statute, criteria were formulated for candidates for the party apparatus, people employed in posts financed from the party budget who are classified as political workers performing a service role with respect to the party committees. According to the statute, party activists can be political workers for party committees if they have much experience in party, social and professional work, and are highly dedicated, with a high moral authority, with appropriate party and professional service, filling elected party offices for one term, and have received favorable comments from the parent party organization.

These criteria are being put into effect with increasing consistency. Consequently, excessively harsh assessments of the present party apparatus, which

after all has been considerably changed and rejuvenated, are unjust and do not correspond to reality. It is not possible to accept the view that the present party apparatus consists primarily of party officials, mostly specialists accustomed to office work. This is an assessment that is unjust to a considerable portion of the party committee workers. Today they are faced with enormous tasks. The quality of the political, ideological and educational work of party echelons and organizations at all levels depends to a decisive degree on their ideological commitment and on their attitudes. They have to learn this political work systematically; they have to talk with people; and they have to be social workers by choice. Also, there are many young people among them, workers who still lack sufficient experience, but who nevertheless have considerable ideological motivation for action. They should be helped, and this can be done by the party organizations to which they belong and by more experienced comrades. The party's activity in the area of guiding society depends on their intellectual level, ideological training, political principles, social commitment and high morale. "As the party is, so Poland will be," as was stated at the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR. This truth should be a signpost for the entire party, and also for the political workers of party committees.

On the road to socialism, there are still many issues that require clarification, specification and correction, but also determined opposition or elimination. The process of economic, social and political stabilization is at the same time a continuation of the class struggle between the adherents and the enemies of socialism. The forces of socialism are increasingly stronger in this battle, and their base is primarily the working class. The protest by the Polish proletariat both in August 1980 and earlier did not mean that the workers were breaking away from socialism, but rather constituted disapproval of its distortion. An indication of such an attitude on the part of an enormous portion of the working class was its increasingly more effective work, and its concern for the future of the Fatherland, and for a better present.

The situation in the country is still difficult. In spite of this, its prospects are clear--continuing to build socialism and form socialist relations in all areas of life. This is the line of socialist renewal, the line of struggle and understanding. There are suitable forces and resources in Poland to carry out these tasks and achieve the desired goals. We need only peace, trust, realism and steadfastness in action.

Party Workers Best Qualified

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 20, 28 Sep 83 p 9

[Article by Tadeusz Kolodziejczyk: "On the Subject of the Party Apparatus"]

[Text] I will not conceal the fact that the external stimulus to speak up on the subject of the party apparatus were extracts from two publications recently upsetting party activists. In the extensive and many-layered journalistic deliberations on the threats, chances, and difficult problems of our development there were serious assertions having to do precisely with the party apparatus: some views sound as if they were directly aimed at that apparatus (Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, TU I TERAZ No 35, 31 August 1983), and some, on the

other hand, as if they are intended to be a "defense" (Jerzy Muszynski, TRYBUNA LUDU 15 September 1983). This clash between two experienced political journalists is interesting in and of itself, like every crossing of swords between people in identical uniforms in the same army. The subject that it deals with, however--an assessment of the party's permanent cadre apparatus--is too important a matter to confine to this dialogue.

The internal stimulus inclining me toward speaking up is the conviction, which has been growing for a long time, that the problems of the party's political apparatus, its place and role in party mechanisms, require open presentation in a party forum, in this case the press. This conviction is not entirely universal within the party apparatus itself; on the contrary, the dominant tendency is toward a more private discussion of these issues, and not thrusting them upon the broader party bodies. I will return again to the reasons for this attitude.

It is not good to prepare an accounting without the host. Possibly outsiders see more clearly, but certainly less. Before the interested parties themselves speak up on this matter (the editorial board of ZYCIE PARTII is preparing, among other things, a discussion on the subject of the party apparatus), I want to indicate certain elements in the situation and the condition of the party cadre apparatus that should be taken into account in presenting honest assessments and not simplified censures. To tell the truth, I am also doing this from something like the position of an outsider, but all the more closely, so that its lens will give a multidimensional picture of the apparatus and not a flat one.

In Secure Positions?

I would warn very much against an excessive generalization of complicated phenomena, since this leads to conclusions that do not correspond to reality. The temptation to make general assessments can be so great that it does not even stop at demagogy.

Here is an example: the accusation is made that during the period of the bitter struggles with the enemy, the party apparatus demonstrated "its militance in secure positions behind the backs of the forces of public order." One could overlook the morally painful expression of such a general accusation, if it were true. Where the forces of order are operating--on the streets, in "unblocking" striking plants--there is no longer any room for apparatus workers, activists and agitators. On the other hand, has anyone counted the number of places and the number of cases in which the forces of public order were not used, since in spite of the tensions it was possible to calm them down? Who succeeded in doing this? This was also the apparatus workers, who laboriously restored the broken thread of understanding in the division of plants, with representatives of the workers. And where were those "secure positions" then, before martial law? In the committees? Be serious....

The time will come for memoirs and diaries from that period, but even today the existing documentation on the activities of the echelons and the party apparatus, the continually vivid experiences remaining with everyone who spent

the last 3 years in the apparatus, could serve as a manual for an accelerated course in consolidating the ties of the apparatus with party elements and with the working class itself. The apparatus went through this course being tested every day, without the possibility of "prompting" from the side and from above, since the "people above" did not know the answers to many questions. And the tester was harsh, and often--delicately speaking--ill-disposed. Thus the tests were "failed," but people presented themselves for "corrections" immediately, and somehow nothing was heard about resignations....

And after martial law was imposed? There are opinions that "the umbrella of the army's protection allowed the apparatus to straighten its shoulders...." Martial law preserved the state structures and the anarchically collapsing economy from final disintegration. Party activists and apparatus workers found themselves in a completely different situation. Was it better? On one hand, yes, since the militarization of many areas brought fundamental order into socioeconomic life, which could not be managed under conditions of chaos. But on the other hand, the fact that it was necessary to use force in the political struggle was a factor that made contact with the working class more difficult for political activists. After all, they had undertaken this contact originally in order to reforge the argument of force into the force of arguments.

During this entire turbulent time, which we can assess so calmly today, it was precisely against them--against the workers of the party's apparatus--that the enemy's main attack fell; they were the ones subjected to unrelenting moral pressure, and they were the ones who were threatened with hanging and "Skansens." Thus one can hardly be surprised that they perceive the accusation of "militance in secure positions" as even more than unjust. There has been a very marked confusion between the front line and the camps....

I have devoted so much space to these accusations so that their moral significance would not burden a further discussion of the apparatus--a discussion that is necessary, but one taking place in the sphere of objective and rational assessments, and also ones that generalize as little as possible.

The Apparatus "As It Is"

The attempt to specify the characteristics of the party apparatus according to one pattern is such a generalization. We say "party activist," and what do we assume? Usually "a professional and a politician." What does this mean?

Let us take the central party apparatus. A certain type of "professional and politician" is essential in the ideological department, a completely different type in the organizational department, yet another in the party inspection organs, and a completely different one in the economic departments. There are more such differences, almost as if each office had its own characteristics. As in every center of a headquarters nature, "brains" are needed, high-class experts, but also "specialists accustomed to office work"--since these are the requirements of a modern working organization.

The extent of the functions fulfilled by the central party apparatus does not permit reducing its workers to a common denominator. How can one compare an inspector whose task is contact and assistance to the regional echelons with an inspector whose task is cooperation in the political inspiration of government elements, which are assuming more and more initiative in the economic sphere? Both have to engage in implementing the party line, but each has a different sphere of issues, and thus also method, qualifications and experience.

Quite different functions are performed by the same people in the provincial committees, even though they work in structures with the same branch designator. Finally, the rudimentary full-time apparatus below the provincial committees again presents a complete difference in functions, and thus methods, etc.

Thus, how can one assess the party apparatus "as such" without taking into account all of these differences which are characteristic of the functional and hierarchical offices of the party structure?

After all, there is no end to this difference in the party apparatus "as such." It is divided into the "elected" and the "appointed," and the situation of these two groups is quite different from what it was a long time ago.

The "elected" ones, i.e., the secretaries of the echelons at all levels up to the Central Committee itself, are subject to rotation after two terms. The "appointed" ones, i.e., the inspectors and administrators, have lost the possibility of a natural advancement in the party hierarchy. It used to be that the road for industrious and competent people was obvious. For example, from instructor to deputy administrator, then to secretary of a county committee, to administrator of a department, to secretary of a provincial committee, and finally to first secretary of a provincial committee, even in another province. Today, by virtue of the statute adopted at the Ninth Congress, we are probably the only party that has closed off to the party apparatus the possibility of an advancement from "appointed" to "elected"--except for member of an echelon, which is an unusual rarity.

Does this lack of prospects within the party apparatus--after all, until recently there was a possibility of advancing all the way up to the post of secretary of the Central Committee--not have an influence on the psychological condition of those who are already working, and does it not discourage possible candidates from selecting this professional path? And how does this reflect on the system for the serious political training of cadres, and consequently on the waste of the capital of knowledge and human experience?

Every person deciding on a choice for a certain path in life knows that the potential guarantees of his career--in the good meaning of this word--lie in his qualifications and his performance. The workers in the party apparatus, if they are aiming at a political career, do not have such guarantees. The lack of privileges, the average wages, the working conditions and hours, the psychological pressure, the political frustrations--all of this seems normal, something to be accepted--but the lack of prospects? So who are they: "office workers" or ideologically despairing people?

The Apparatchiks

They are reluctant to discuss their problems. In this there is a sort of surprising modesty, resulting from their dealing with large and great issues, in comparison to which their own problems recede to a secondary level.

They know a great deal, and they are more familiar than anyone else with the weaknesses of the apparatus and all the complexities of high-level policy. Constituting a natural base of centers for political directives, they have a feeling of responsibility resulting from the possibility of influencing party policy, and they know their limitations.

The delegates to the Ninth Congress, ruling in the statute that "political workers perform a service role with respect to the party committees," cited only what was an unquestioned characteristic of the party apparatus: its service. We know that this was not always service to the committee; often it was service to its executive organ or to the secretary, since the truth is that the party apparatus was the way the party leadership wanted it to be. Therefore, criticism of the apparatus, its composition, traits, and methods of work should be directed higher.

In the last 2 or 3 years, there have been profound changes in the party apparatus. This is not just a question of those which can be illustrated by the structure of age, education, origin, or length of service--though the apparatus has undergone major changes in this respect--but rather above all a question of changes in attitudes and views, in working methods and in the understanding of service. The experiences of these years--in which the people in the party apparatus knew the bitterness of setbacks and humiliations, and met so little understanding and recognition, not to mention friendliness--indicate that today "excessively harsh assessments" should be replaced by ones that are simply objective.

Any general and statistical assessments that do not perceive the process of changes in the party apparatus and the multiple aspects of the problem will be received as an attack on the apparatus, and will force defensive actions. Why open this front, for which so many volunteers would present themselves?

One should follow the counsel of wise Tacitus, who recommended proceeding "since ira et studio" on important matters. It is precisely on an issue as important and as sensitive to the party as its political apparatus, since it affects a group of people actively involved in carrying out its policy, that the recommendation of an examination "without anger and partiality" is a fundamental requirement.

An objective examination of the party's permanent cadres will set in motion the mechanism of disclosing knowledge about the apparatus, and remove its unnecessary confidentiality. This is the only possible path to a report on the state of the apparatus, a path on which the apparatus will not present itself for a report.

Class Enemies Responsible

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 44, 2 Nov 83 p 5

[Article by Adam Rostowski: "Acceptance and Doubts"]

[Text] An unusually interesting article by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski under the significant title "Threats and Chances" (TU I TERAZ No 35, 31 August 1983) contains many obvious assertions and assessments, perceived as a rule by the average citizen of our country. There is, however, an entire series of completely new, surprising, and controversial assessments, predictions and proposals that incite discussion.

A great many doubts are aroused in me by the thesis that the time has already come to push the ideological-political struggle with the enemies of socialism and the People's Republic of Poland, and especially the political struggle, into the background, especially since--as Kwiatkowski demands--this is to affect the political enemies and opponents both inside and outside the country. In fact, the author emphasized that "they still constitute real threats," but it is not necessary now to concern oneself chiefly with them. The main front of the struggle should be shifted to the groups within our own camp and we should deal not only with the "adherents of technocratic reforms" with convergent attitudes, who are gradually steering the country toward a disguised and specific native NEP [New Economic Policy], but also with the "sectarian politicians of conservative circles," with all types of "dogmatics," "concrete," "apparatchiks," etc., who--as the author ironically emphasizes-- "call themselves the true proletarian or Marxist-Leninist left." Obviously after such an internal battle in the party, the only ones remaining on the battlefield would be those who have chosen a path "through the very center" of the complex issues, disputes, problems, and complicated struggle over the aspect of the party, the country, and socialism in Poland.

In such a concept I perceive extreme simplifications, and even fundamental tactical errors that could yield deplorable consequences if the concept thus begun were to be carried out in the present stage.

The call, even today, to shift the front of the struggle with the political and ideological opponent into the background may appear at least surprising, especially since it is recommended by a publicist of the stature of S. Kwiatkowski. After all, the political-ideological opponent has not been completely crushed and liquidated. One may partially agree with the view that "after the crushing of the political extremists and the curbing of the underground, one can see quite clearly their diminishing chances for influencing the working class...." Nevertheless, belittling their opportunities for action may turn out to be very harmful, especially since American imperialism in intensifying its activity on a global scale. The Western strategists have no intention whatsoever of ceasing their perfidious playing of the so-called Polish card, counting on new disorders between the Bug and the Oder which would help them in their attempts to destabilize the states of the socialist community. In my opinion, the opponents actively operating against socialism are not going

away. We also cannot overlook part of the reactionary clergy, who, while preserving their conquests thus far, have not completely gone on the defensive, and everything indicates that they do not intend to do so in the near future.

These are the facts; we cannot minimize them if we truly desire stabilization and social peace. Thus the struggle against the ideological-political enemy who rejects the socialist concept of understanding and cooperation should still be the primary issue. This is especially necessary because, as S. Kwiatkowski describes accurately, the "defensive" style of action and struggle with the opponent is predominant. One can also acknowledge that "all the militance of our propaganda ends either in convincing those who are already convinced, or in repeating the old mistakes." My feeling is that we should and must discredit the opponent, but besides this we should conduct a struggle with arguments supported by rational activity in accordance with the socialist *raison d'etat*. One must also agree with S. Kwiatkowski when he states that at many levels of our party-political and propaganda activity "especially in journalism, people avoid a class interpretation of the phenomena occurring in Poland and in the world." This is probably also the reason for the helplessness with respect to the political opposition, when one should oppose it and attack it intellectually in ideological clashes. Emphasizing the weakness and the anemic nature of the activities of the underground and the so-called political opposition, S. Kwiatkowski nevertheless admits that "they may become threats again, strengthening themselves through out mistakes." There is nothing to add or subtract. I think that it would be precisely that kind of mistake to propose shifting the fronts of the struggles. Experience shows that the struggle with the political opponent should be carried out to the end, until it is completely destroyed and liquidated. There are grounds for asserting that under Polish conditions the ideological-political struggle should and must be carried out on several levels, and thus, I feel, on the most important one, i.e., with the opponents of socialism and the enemies of the People's Republic of Poland, and also with the revisionist forces with convergent orientations, in the broad meaning of the word, and with the real dogmatists and "sectarian politicians from conservative circles."

I am afraid, however, that we will not give an appropriately objective picture of the present situation in the party--in the PZPR--if we utilize simplified divisions into revisionists and adherents of convergent solutions on one hand, and dogmatists, sectarians, or hardliners on the other. It is my impression that S. Kwiatkowski has permitted himself such a mistake, or rather simplification, in his deliberations. Thus also the conclusions and proposals that he puts forward are not always logical, coherent, and adequate for actual reality. It is obvious that both groups are still in our party. Generally, however, the line of division runs between those with a proworker orientation and those who treat the workers as objects, as an instrument for the realization of their own goals, which are often disguised and far from socialism. After all, S. Kwiatkowski also points out this matter in stating correctly that "it is precisely neglect harming the working people that has always been the main source of all the crisis stoppages and political conflicts."

Practice irrefutably shows that as soon as the workers--the working people--stop being treated as the object of all systemic-societal measures, anarcho-syndicalist tendencies and delusions have increasingly easier access to their

embittered ranks, and it becomes increasingly easier for antisocialist politicians, the reactionary faction of the clergy, or foreign sabotage centers to operate within their ranks. Thus also, as S. Kwiatkowski correctly emphasizes, in assessing people in the party and in state posts, "the highest criterion is and must be the attitude toward the worker question." This, however, is not a question of giving in to the impulsiveness of the worker masses, of following behind them, but rather of actually leading them and acting above all to defend their basic vital interests.

A Marxist-Leninist party, with such determining factors, must play the role of the vanguard of the working people. On the other hand, if it does not want to allow social conflicts, then in my opinion it must investigate the justifiable dissatisfaction of working people--if such a situation exists--in a skillful manner and at the proper time. It must possess the capacity for preemptive action, since the political and ideological opponent is succeeding in rapidly and effectively making use of every delay by the party or the people's government. In order for such mechanisms to be able to operate systematically in the party and in the government, what we need is precisely people who are courageous, principled, with a political education, committed, and not giving in passively to the charisma of authorities; above all, we need people and activists with a proworker orientation. This, however, is not a question of conducting periodic purges in the party or in the government apparatus--although in drastic cases they will perhaps be necessary--but rather of freeing ourselves, as S. Kwiatkowski suggests, from "dubious ideological orientations," which, in my opinion, have been smuggled more and more actively to our Polish party ground.

We ought to recall V. Lenin's polemic with his opponents, presented in his work entitled "What Is To Be Done?" Lenin, describing the situation in the ranks of the Russian Social Democrats at the beginning of our century, stated among other things: "Thus we can see that the loud cant against the ossification of thought, etc., only screens a lack of concern and passiveness in the area of the development of theoretical thought (...) the celebrated freedom to criticize does not mean defending one theory against another, but rather freedom from any monolithic and thoughtout theory; it means eclecticism and a lack of principles." Speaking of a certain decline in the theoretical level among the party activists and the aktiv, Lenin explains further: "Many people who have received very little theoretical preparation or none at all have joined the movement in view of its practical significance and practical achievements." Next criticizing the journalists of the journal RABOCHIE DELO, who had pointed with a triumphant air to Karl Marx's statement that "every step by a real movement is more important than a dozen programs," V. Lenin ironically concludes, "Repeating these words at a time of theoretical confusion is equivalent to calling out at the sight of a funeral procession, 'You ought to go on that way forever!'" In addition--as Lenin writes--these words of Marx come from a letter on the Gotha program, from a letter in which Marx sharply condemns the eclecticism permitted in the formulation of principles: "If you must unite"--Marx wrote to the leaders of the party--"then include agreements for the sake of realizing the practical goals of the movement, but do not permit a bartering of principles, and do not make theoretical concessions." This is what Marx's view was like, but among us there have been people who--citing Marx--attempt to weaken the significance of theory! This

was the genesis of the famous statement on the significance of theory by V. Lenin, who in the next sentence, after the questions described above, clearly stated, "Without a revolutionary theory, a revolutionary movement is also impossible."

It is worthwhile to realize that V. Lenin conducted this polemic with his opponents from the circles of the so-called economists and critics over 80 years ago, when the situation in the Russian and European workers movement was not good. I think that V. Lenin's assessments and conclusions are in very many aspects applicable to an analysis of the situation in today's European workers' movement, and also to an assessment of and predictions for developments of the situation here in Poland.

Perhaps I have digressed a bit from the matters raised in S. Kwiatkowski's article, but I think that recalling Lenin's position on the above-mentioned issues contributes to a more complete illumination of the entire ideological sphere of our deliberations.

This is especially necessary, since S. Kwiatkowski's accusation is very serious: "The PZPR is responsible here for making socialism more scientific, especially since Marxism has been pushed to one side and does not play the role of an instrument--it is used for moralization, for belief, but not for the transformation of social reality." I am afraid that these accusations, however, are too far reaching and a kind of simplification, but we cannot take them into account in analyzing our Polish reality.

I wish to emphasize that the tendencies and practical decisions resulting in the embitterment of working people, leading directly to social tensions and successive crises, occurred precisely when we lost our proworker position. After their mitigation and the periodic realization of a forced proworker course, people advocating technocratic, managerist, and convergent views again became prominent. Opportunism and voluntarism again got the upper hand--that is how the party and the state were guided. The state of the dictatorship of the proletariat did not properly fulfill its role, especially in relation to the public enemies of socialism and of the People's Republic of Poland. In the name of an illusory national unity, the class view of social phenomena began to disappear. And then the enemy unceremoniously turned to his own use the mistakes and political stupidity of such convergent views.

The last issue that seriously disturbed me was the cadre problem, and especially party cadres. I am surprised--and I am not the only one, I think--by S. Kwiatkowski's excessively arbitrary tone in those assessments, especially when he states that "The present apparatus is predominantly party officials (...) accustomed to office work (...) accustomed to working only within the structure of the authorities (...) today's cadres of 'professional revolutionaries' are not successful in opposing the enemies...."

I think that this is too far reaching a generalization and a simplification. Undoubtedly in today's party apparatus there are still a large number of such workers, but a considerable majority are not "officials capable only of office work," but people who were brought in during the period of the struggle with the opponent, even before the imposition of martial law. In this difficult

struggle, a majority of them firmly acquired the skills of acting directly among working people, and are in favor of a proworker direction for solutions. By expressing arbitrary, excessively generalized, and simplified or pejorative assessments, we are simply doing our comrades in the joint struggle a great injustice. For my part, this is not an attempt to woo the comrades in the apparatus. I am far from doing that. I had the opportunity, however, of observing many of them every day for a period of almost 2 years and I did not find any grounds, with the possible exception of a few cases, for specifying such assessments.

It is obvious that a great deal in this regard depends on the cadre policy of the party and the state. I think that this is a separate subject for discussion, and not just a journalistic one. A great deal also depends, and here I fully share S. Kwiatkowski's opinion, on whether the line of a proworker orientation triumphs in the party and the state. In my opinion, this depends on all the members of the party who have just such an orientation, and on the political leadership of our country.

Dispute Allows Progress

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 41, 12 Oct 83 pp 3, 4

[Article by Ludwik Krasucki: "Seven Deceptive Charms"]

[Text] I would like to take up some of the points raised by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski in his article "Dangers and Chances" [TU I TERAZ, 31 August 1983]. The article describes certain deceptive charms, which have a negative influence on the thoughts and actions of many people--both inside and outside the party. I take a similar view of some of these charms--but not all of them.

The Charm of Seeing Everything in Black and White

The article "Dangers and Chances," while published on 31 August, was not meant to commemorate the anniversary [of the August agreements], although the events of August 1980 are taken as a point of reference. This in itself means that the article's author has taken a certain position, since many people want to forget this crisis or convince others that it should be forgotten. This kind of attitude always won out after previous upheavals; 3 years after the events of October 1956 or August [sic] 1970 there were few people willing to go back to them. But today the situation is different, and the policies mapped out at the Ninth PZPR Congress draw on the experiences gained during the events of August 1980.

Kwiatkowski's reminiscences and assessments range from whole-hearted approval to fierce negation. Some of us, without falling into extremes, look at the various factors that added up to the August upheaval in isolation from each other without their relation to the totality. Consequently, there are articles justifying the workers' protest, while others talk of a plot by anti-socialist forces. Texts on the benefits of talking "like one Pole with another" are printed alongside criticism of apolitical solidarism, there are articles about the party's resurgence" and about its "retreat." The different factors which went to make up the situation at that time are perceived in

isolation, and this has been--and occasionally still is--accompanied by an embarrassing tendency to make oversimplified judgments on the underlying causes of the crisis, seeing everything in black and white.

Without attempting to make value judgments, I will list a few of these oversimplifications--the tendency to lay all the blame on Gierk and his advisors, on the system (supposedly unreformable) on the emergence of "a new class," on the "imminent evil" (of July 1944), on the Workers Defense Committee (KOR), on the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), on Solidarity extremists, on the innate faults of the Polish nation, etc.

The Poles behave like schoolchildren at times, preferring arithmetic to algebra, and algebra to higher maths. They end up helpless when faced with multiple equations containing a number of unknown quantities, so they resort to oversimplification. But being nonetheless aware of the limited value of simplification, they end up shouting at all those who try to point this out.

This avalanche of oversimplification and black-and-white schemes is becoming unbearable. Sustaining normalization has for months been the main task of party members and all supporters of socialism in Poland. As normalization progresses, it becomes increasingly important to ask what this is to achieve and whose interests it is to promote. Where should normalization lead? How is the desired "norm"--implicit in the term normalization--supposed to be understood?

These are the questions raised by Kwiatkowski. The 40-year history of the Polish People's Republic has on several occasions provided proof that there is an enormous price to be paid for giving in to the deceptive charm of oversimplification. I see Kwiatkowski's article as a warning of this danger, and a call for people to understand the real significance and complexity of events and come to grips with the concrete situation we have found ourselves in. Creative methods of research should be employed to that end, and even the most difficult questions of Marxism-Leninism must not be avoided.

The Charm of Easy Analogies

Kwiatkowski recalls the period of the NPE, which for some reason is seldom referred to in Poland; little is known about it. I think most Polish writers have adopted the attitude of biographers who carefully avoid any periods in their hero's when he seems to have strayed from the path of virtue. Yet the decision to introduce the NEP was exceptionally important and proved extremely fruitful, paving the way for the further pioneering development of the first socialist state. I agree with Kwiatkowski that by returning to these experiences we can enrich our understanding of contemporary Poland. But how should we return to them?

Those features of the NEP which "constituted a substantial reintroduction of capitalism," as Kwiatkowski puts it, seem of minor importance to Poland in the present situation. Lenin introduced the NEP in a backward, ruined country, isolated and surrounded by hostile neighbors, which had to enter into the initial stage of industrialization.

The working class was socially weak, with peasants and smallholders constituting the majority of Soviet society. The population's basic needs had to be satisfied. None of these features can be transposed to present-day Poland despite all its troubles. Even if the events of recent years have made it necessary to apply some of the "negative" measures on the NEP, these are, in fact, only of minor, secondary importance.

What, then, is the main significance of the NEP in Poland's present situation? Let's put it this way--at that time, with state power held by socialists only in the Soviet Union, the NEP was the first practical confrontation between the socialist revolution and the system it had established on the one hand, and on the other, market relations, the law of value, material incentives and the income differentials resulting from them. The essence of the NEP was to replace the policy of war communism with a policy which took more consideration of these factors.

This turn has gone down as part of Soviet history, but its main characteristics have a much wider significance, since they apply to all periods of building socialism in peacetime, regardless of the given country or particular historical circumstances.

The history of socialist countries is full of discussion and controversy on this question, which has even given rise to internal struggle within the communist movement, to attempts at reform and counterreform. There have been numerous cases of self-criticism, based on the claim that the law of value had been ignored, the needs of the market and its laws neglected, and material incentives disregarded, with those responsible for the economy falling into the trap of overcentralized decision-making, which had replaced social processes with the directives and orders produced by a voluntaristic planning system based on wishful thinking. There have also been numerous cases where these problems were approached in an incorrect way, contrary to the very essence of socialism, e.g., the tendency to blur the characteristic features of the system by talking of the convergence of capitalism and socialism, the fascination with technocracy, or the nostalgic dreams of a return to 19th-century capitalist competition.

In this context, let us now talk seriously about the dangers that are posed. I do not believe that present-day Poland is threatened with "a substantial reintroduction of capitalism." The real danger is that the current attempt to link ideological objectives, class criteria and the social principles of socialism to the efficient management of the economy will end in failure, just like previous attempts. The efficient management I refer to would have to make skillful use of all aspects of the real--not exaggerated or minimized--role of market relations, of the law of value and material incentives. This role has to correspond to Poland's present situation, which, while in many respects far from the model of a "developed socialist society," nevertheless represents a fairly advanced stage of the transition period to socialism.

It is essential to draw on analogies with other periods and the experiences of other socialist countries. However, we must avoid taking refuge in easy analogies.

The Charm of One-sided Solutions

Kwiatkowski calls a spade a spade, pointing to the frequently observed contradiction between the basic ideals of socialism, including the principle of social justice, and the mechanisms necessary to insure rational management of the economy and a high level of productivity, which lead to the differentiation of living standards. To put it simply, socialism has two aims--to produce as much as possible, and to distribute this as equally as possible. The latter has generally been easier to achieve. Yet justice without efficiency does not bring prosperity. Efficiency may only be one of the elements of the socialist concept of social justice, but in the long run it is an essential one.

Poland today faces the enormous dilemma of how to reconcile the practical consequences of safeguarding social justice, as understood by the working class, with practical measures to rationalize the economy and increase efficiency. In my opinion, this is the most difficult problem of the current period. Increased efficiency is absolutely indispensable if this country is to overcome its crisis, which is first and foremost an economic one. However, it is impossible to rationalize the economy, to stimulate, or even--excuse the expression--force through increased efficiency, without expanding the role of material incentives. And these, by their very nature, extend the differentiation of living standards.

Kwiatkowski shows how many questions are linked to this problem and how many differences of opinion there are regarding possible solutions. The first conclusion to be drawn from the contradiction described above is that caution must be exercised in making decisions at the moment, they have to be carefully considered over a long period of time, and should be preceded by broad public consultation. The decision-making process has to take place in full view of the public. On the other hand, bold answers are required in ideology and theory, if these are to have a real impact on practice. The working class is waiting for these answers.

In August, the workers demanded a well-regulated and sensibly managed economy as well as social justice. Extremists warped these demands, advancing an anti-socialist concept of economic reform and encouraging unrealistic demands concerning pay and conditions. However, the way is now virtually clear for a dialogue with the working class on key problems of both economic efficiency and social justice.

These are currently the most important problems for the party to discuss with the working class it represents.

This dialogue will be difficult, just as the life of workers is today difficult, but it can and should produce positive results. Anything that can be done in either of these directions is of the utmost importance to Poland's workers, who are neither idealized angels having red flags nor inferior "minions," but the millions of people who travel to work every morning. Firstly, steps have to be taken to lift the economy out of stagnation and improve efficiency, as otherwise the only thing to be evenly distributed will be poverty. Secondly, steps have to be taken to develop the practical content

of social justice, in the widest possible sense of the term, as otherwise, given the technocratic and anti-egalitarian experiences of the past decade, the economic reform and other similar measures will not appear credible. The charm of one-sided solutions, of the "either...or" type of thinking, is deceptive. The main task is to ease and eventually overcome this contradiction, a contradiction which other people seem to have far less trouble coping with than we do.

In this context, Kwiatkowski outlines various trends, and describes the influence of various classes of various social and political forces.

As he correctly observes, the "rationalists" and the "egalitarians" are constantly competing with each other to make their voices heard. I personally am of the opinion that the dispute between the two is a necessary one, since it brings certain facts into better focus, and cautions us against one-sided solutions. There is no room in a constructive discussion for extreme views--the idea of economic efficiency without socialism, or that of socialism without economic efficiency. Both are examples of demagogy, and merely serve to interrupt a serious discussion on extremely complex matters.

The Charm of Virginal Purity

We have a deep-rooted dislike of capitalists, that is true. However, to confront this attitude with reality, we cannot pretend to be unaware of the things Kwiatkowski writes about. We cannot ignore the fact that there are private family farms in this country and small private businesses, which, among other things, breed capitalist values. Then there are the small capitalist firms, which possess their own plant and equipment, and finally the holders of retail franchises, who often get rich quickly and then look for ways to climb further up the ladder of personal prosperity.

In his article "Karl Marx and the Contemporary World" (VOPROSY FILOSOFIY, No 4/1983), P. N. Fiedosieyev writes, "The experiences of the socialist countries confirm that socialism can fully triumph and be consolidated only via a uniform socioeconomic system based on social ownership of the means of production. Any attempt to force through a direct transition from capitalism or precapitalist social relations to socialism is bound to end in failure as is any attempt to eliminate commodity exchange or petty commodity production prematurely. This shows how farsighted Marx was in insisting on the inevitability of a transition period between capitalism and socialism, which may be of longer or shorter duration."

Does this mean that "the crisis has pushed Poland back to the beginning of the transition period, with all that this means in practice?"

There are fewer private family farms in Poland now than there were 10 years ago, a lot fewer than 20 years ago; there are also fewer private workshops than 10 years ago, although slightly more than 20 years ago. In recent years, only Polonian companies have been added to the sector of small capitalist firms. The network of retail outlets run on a franchise basis developed chiefly in the 1970's; there are now fewer of these and some of them now

function on a "semiprivate" basis, supervised and controlled by state-owned parent enterprises.

In fact, this whole sector has not expanded all that much, yet the expansion that has occurred is a source of considerable irritation. This is primarily because business is booming for these firms despite the crisis, which is something that cannot be said of many state-run enterprises; this is also because those employed in these firms are enjoying higher pay and better living standards at a time when living standards are generally falling.

With the market completely out of balance at the moment, these firms are exploiting every opportunity to fill the gaps left by the state sector. So what should be done about this? Should these firms be banned, abolished? Fine, but what are we going to put in their place? No, the solution has to be different--this sector is a fairly small capitalist island in a sea of socialism; it should be controlled more tightly and subject to stricter regulations.

This particularly applies to stepping up economic discipline and imposing sanctions for any attempt to bend the rules.

However, there is another problem that I personally consider far more important. At a time when there is a severe shortage of consumer goods, we are witnessing a worrying expansion of the illegal, untaxed economy. This "black economy" includes moonlighting of all sorts, jobs done "on the side" (often using tools and materials purloined from the state), casual employment in the countryside at weekends and during vacations, building and decorating work, widespread trade in goods sold under the counter, obtained from foreign aid parcels brought into the country people working abroad, or bought in Pewex shops, and direct deliveries of food from the countryside to customers or middlemen in town. These are just a few examples. The "black economy" is not just inhabited by professional profiteers--many workers, members of the intelligentsia farmers, pensioners and housewives are also involved in it.

It is currently impossible to provide a full answer to the old question--how do people make their living? Neither the "black economy" nor the resultant redistribution of national income are included in any statistics, except for cases of profiteering uncovered by the authorities. What we are talking about is a disease with multiple repercussions. It is high time to think about how to cure it.

What is both the weakest side of socialism in Poland and at the same time--and I stress this--its greatest chance for the future? The mighty public sector. The public sector dominates the country's economic life, possesses fixed assets incomparably greater than any other sector and employs millions of people (including the highest proportion of personnel, with secondary or university education). A quick glance at the Statistical Yearbook will convince anyone of the preeminent position occupied by state and cooperative ownership in contemporary Poland. It is therefore hardly surprising that the public in general and workers in particular usually make value judgments concerning the system, the authorities and the party on the basis of the efficiency of the public sector, its ability to satisfy society's needs, empirical observations of its features of development, and how it compares with other countries.

It is in the public sector that the battle to consolidate and develop socialism in Poland will be decided. We have found ourselves "at the beginning of the transition period" primarily because the public sector has been weakened. Also because the regulating and disciplining influence it has on the activities of individuals, franchise-holders and petty capitalists has diminished.

Bearing this in mind, I personally regard the various calls for a crusade against the private sector as nothing more than expression of helplessness in the face of certain shortcomings--shortcomings which are the most important to us and the closest to our hearts, since they are our own. These calls are also sometimes no more than a sly method of using cheap populist demagogy to question the entire policy of the ninth congress.

We are spellbound by the charm of virginally pure socialism, uncontaminated by any admixtures of petty capitalism or petty commodity production, free of all petty bourgeois elements. Some day we shall probably create such a system. But for the time being, in order to reduce the role and proportion of the offensive ingredients mentioned above, we should first restore the foundation of socialism, the public sector to its proper state of health. This applies to all its constituent parts, including shops, services and restaurants, which find it the most difficult to stand comparison with their "private" counterparts. Yet the examples of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and those efficient shops and restaurants which do exist in Poland prove that this state of affairs is by no means irreversible.

The Charm of 9 Days' Wonders

"Dangers and Chances" takes up two kinds of deviation--rightist ones, ultra-leftist ones. Let's begin with the former. Discussions, polemics and press commentaries have in fact dealt with two kinds of rightist revisionism, in recent years--one of these being imaginary while the other is real and this unfortunately confuses the situation and makes the struggle against genuine deviations more difficult. Imaginary revisionism is the one portrayed as a ubiquitous phenomenon that is allegedly only opposed by a handful of orthodox Marxist-Leninists.

As we all know, there is no shortage of epithets which can be attached to various ideas, while arguments can always be backed up by quotations taken out of context, by insinuations and verbal professions of faith, of devotion to "leftist" ideas and "principled" positions. We have heard all of this many times in the past. Perhaps it is worth reminding these people how often the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, both in Lenin's time and after his death, faced not just a rightist opposition, but also an ultraleftist one.

The fundamental problem, however, is real revisionism. This is strongly connected with the charm of 9 days' wonders, which in this case are political tunes that became hits in the initial phase of the post-August shock. Today these hits are rarely sung in public--more often they are quietly hummed, but they cannot be shaken off, tunes once heard and instantly remembered. The words to these tunes must be constantly criticized to safeguard the process of renewal against harmful deviations. Up till now, the weakness of

this criticism has been that it is principally conducted in a doctrinaire fashion, with no reference to reality and no analysis of the validity of individual arguments. There have been few attempts to demonstrate that apart from all other considerations, a given proposal simply cannot be implemented, and if it was, would only cause damage.

There is, for example, a popular myth of direct democracy. Many people have come to believe that the best way of stimulating democracy of making representative institutions less bureaucratic and more effective, would be to base the state system on various forms of direct democracy, to the detriment of various intermediate forms.

However, this concept is simply impracticable. Some forms of direct democracy can be incorporated into our system, but the operation of socialist democracy is determined by the conscious participation and influence of workers, peasants and intellectuals, i.e., of social groups whose numbers run into millions.

It is quite impossible for millions of people to participate in a common debate. For this reason, numerous forms and levels of democratic procedure, together with a highly-developed structure of representative institutions, are required in order to articulate and defend the interests of these millions. The important thing is for these bodies to be active, representative and authentically democratic, independent not of the system or the state, but of the corresponding tiers of the state apparatus; without this kind of independence, we shall witness a reappearance of advisory councils specially appointed to nod polite approval. This is the really crucial issue of socialist renewal, as opposed to pipe dreams of direct democracy.

A further example is the myth of a ruling, but not governing, party. Prior to August 1980, the activity of the party was intertwined with the work of the state apparatus and administration, which led to the party, stage-managing the work of the latter, or even doing its work for it, while the formula "the party and the government" was repeated continuously (which gave rise to the general view of society as divided into "them" and "us").

After August, as a reaction against all this, there emerged a myth of the party playing a leading role but deliberately dissociating itself from the actual process of government, merely influencing the latter from outside. But this is just not feasible. It is in the nature of every political party to try to influence the government and the way in which the country is run. In the case of the working class party of a socialist state, its leading role in that state is a principle of the system, it is the pillar on which the whole structure rests.

The real problem of socialist renewal is not to disengage the party from the process of government, but to create a system in which the state carries out the functions of a state, the Government governs, the administration administers, and the party has both a direct and indirect influence on all of them, but exercises this influence only within the law, primarily through institutions of socialist democracy, remaining close enough to these bodies to see that problems are solved in line with the workers' interests and the

principles of socialism, yet distant enough to control these bodies critically and demandingly.

To make things perfectly clear, I should explain that I don't view the discussions of recent years as a sign of confusion, I don't believe we have fallen into traps set by our enemies. On the contrary, I think that in large measure the party's chances for the future depend on it being able to utilize the great progress achieved during these discussions. To this end it should be reviewed and analyzed, the good elements in it collated and taken to their logical conclusion. If this is done, the proponents of the "good old methods" will not be able to use the exaggerations, 9 days' wonders and plain nonsense that crept into the discussion as their crowning argument against the line of the ninth congress or as a pretext for whipping up a hysteria that does a huge disservice to the struggle against real rightist deviations. This is just one reason for struggling to overcome the charm of 9 days' wonders.

The Charm of Old Instruments

Many people love old instruments; they possess great charm. But not in politics. Here you need a good piano. And you can't just pound the bass keys or tinkle the treble ones, you have to use both hands simultaneously. Old instruments are tempting--we know them, we have grown accustomed to them, and the tendency to repeat old habits and roles is only natural. Personal interests also play a part here. This may be a question of material gain, or of influence and prestige. There has never been a reform in history, and this includes the history of socialism, which has not faced obstacles in the form of old ideas, schemes and methods. Even reform has to overcome conservative opposition, and this is doubly true of a reform as far-reaching as that outlined by the ninth congress.

For many months the struggle to return to normal was our main target. This united the party and all the supporters of socialism. But I agree with Kwiatkowski that today conservative prejudice of all kinds will block progress toward lasting transformations. There will be--sorry, there are--more prejudices than people are aware that they are prejudiced.

There is a tendency toward instinctive, emotional dogmatism, which is based on good intentions and frequently stems from the bitter experience of committed people, mindful of the recent danger to the cause they have devoted all their efforts to. There are also others who use a dogmatic approach for their own factional ends, posing as those who "defend principles."

These phenomena are significant as they coincide with established inclinations, reactions and habits, the fear of change, the trust people have in everything that is tried and tested and their distrust of everything new. These phenomena become dangerous when translated into demagoguery in an attempt to discredit new policies on the basis of faults they have not produced or unpopular decisions which are unavoidable.

All in all, there are not many conscious defenders of the old methods, although those that do exist are often both vociferous and effective. There are far more people who would like to adjust to the new ways but just can't manage to

make the change. So we still aren't all pulling together in the same direction. Some people want to leap forward, while others are dragging them back. This kind of situation raises doubts--what do "those people" really want? Mayakowski warned against letting canaries peck socialism to death. Today it is possible to imagine the successful development of socialism in Poland without a consistent and carefully conceived process of renewal. But this is endangered not only by canaries, but also by many other birds, not necessarily of the domesticated variety.

The charm of old instruments cannot be traced to individual structures of places in the country. People with different attitudes, undergoing different phases of reeducation now hold posts at all levels, from the central party apparatus to local village administration. In this situation, a lot depends on the conductors of the orchestra, who have to wave their batons in a clear direction and tap loudly enough on their music-stand when they have to. But will this be enough? We are stubborn, we like to stick to our own views, quarrel, and try to drown others out in shouting; instead of looking at what is really involved in disputes, we prefer to take them personally, turning discussions into rows. Ideological work is of the greatest importance here. We have to be patient and learn how to read the music properly. Anyone who deliberately and persistently causes discord thereby excludes himself from the orchestra.

There are two kinds of differences of opinion. Some of these result from careful, sensitive reactions and courageous thinking, motivated by concern and a sense of responsibility. These are beneficial. Differences of the other kind are harmful, as they are motivated by destructive intentions which produce destructive results. This is immediately visible to the naked eye.

The Charm of Mental Laziness

The main message of Kwiatkowski's article is that it is not enough to shout "Quiet, please!" When the audience finally quietens down, Marxists must have a lot to say. What they say should be intelligible, interesting and convincing, and should be said in the audience's native language. The quality of form and content is decisive. But achieving this quality is greatly impeded by the tendency to intellectual inertia and mental laziness. Mental laziness has a great charm--all the more reason for ridding ourselves of it.

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POLEMICIST DEFENDS PARTY CADRES

Warsaw RZECZYWISTOSC in Polish No 41, 9 Oct 83 p 13

[Article by Boleslaw Porowski: "An Out-of-Focus Projection"]

[Text] In the No 35 issue of TU I TERAZ, Stanislaw Kwiatkowski's extensive essay entitled "Impending Dangers and Prospects" appeared. What he writes does not inspire any cheerful thoughts--not only in connection with the forecast of the socioeconomic and political presented but with the conclusions drawn from it.

S. Kwiatkowski admittedly has undertaken an extremely difficult task: to enumerate the principal threats to socialist development and also its primary causative forces. In doing so, he expressed the regret that "there is an avoidance, especially in journalism, of a unequivocal class interpretation of events occurring in Poland and in the world," which suggests that in his writings we will be dealing with class criteria and a reliable explanation of the innermost recesses of the present, very complex situation in Poland after 3 years of recovery from the faulty policies of the Gierek-Jaroszewicz team and after 3 years of the renewal process.

It is possible that Kwiatkowski wanted to present a class analysis of events, a reliably documented political and ideological essay. Unfortunately, the essay contains traces of groundless generalizations, superficiality, and ahistorism. Thus, accurate observations and sociological reflections, in collision with somewhat-arbitrary generalizations, lose a great deal of their significance. Whereas the entire projection, and particularly the prognoses and prescriptions deduced from it, is difficult to accept.

1.

Kwiatkowski very correctly notes that in recent years "the multi-system nature of the economy has intensified." There is no doubt that this is a retreat into "the depths of the interim period with all of the consequences that stem from this." In this context, his concern "that recovery from the crisis not be a abandonment of socialism in Poland" sounds encouraging. And, as befits an advocate of the reform camp, in a way that bears no contradiction he says that

"Without market solutions, without state capitalism as defined by Leninism, there is no way that we will be able to recover from the crisis." Possibly this categorical judgment is correct, but it has to be proved in a convincing manner. Especially that this "intensification of the multi-system nature of the economy is state capitalism as understood by Leninism."

It is true that Kwiatkowski seems to unmask "the advocates of various types of neocapitalistic private, Polonian, managerial enterprise, declaring themselves in favor of free-market solutions according to the models of primitive capitalism," but also, not too convincingly, he proves that the growing private and Polonian activeness is not this neocapitalistic enterprise, and that market solutions are not a free-market provenance.

In proof of his judgments he refers to the experience of the NEP [New Economic Plan]. In it he looks for similarities and justifications for the structural transformations of our economy. Meanwhile, neither the preconditions nor the causes which lay at the bases of the Leninist NEP, nor even its model solutions, are in any way reminiscent of the present determinants, the situation of the Polish economy, and the accepted methods for overcoming the crisis.

Some brief reminders: first World War I and then the civil war ravaged Russia, so rich in raw materials but economically and civilizationally backward. The economic ruin was further aggravated by the drouths which affected the Soviet Union's arable regions in the years immediately preceding the proclamation of the NEP. The country also acutely felt the effects of the so-called "sanitary cordon" [quarantine] which blocked any attempts to bring Soviet Russia out of economic isolation. The needs of the civil war forced the young Soviet authorities to introduce, in the years immediately after the revolution, the economics of a wartime communism, within which the revolutionary government seized the peasants' farm-production surplus in order to save its own armed forces and factory workforces from starvation. The revolutionary staff knew that the economics of wartime communism were not conducive to the activization of an economic potential and the building of an economic framework for a peasant-workers alliance. But it found itself under the pressure of the imperatives of that phase of the revolution. After repulsing outside intervention and counterrevolution, the economics of wartime communism became outdated. As a matter of fact, its methods did not comply with the spirit of a socialist revolution nor were they adequate to the tasks which faced the young Soviet government in peacetime. Under these circumstances, the 10th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] in March 1921 announced the principles of the so-called new economic policy (NEP). In relation to the peasants this meant replacement of levies on agricultural production with payment of taxes in kind and the creation of incentives to development of farm production by allowing the peasants to sell their surplus on the local open market. The essence of this solution was based on the fact that only this surplus was subjected to the free swings of the market. Thus money-market relations were restored, but within a limited range. For clarity we must stress here that Lenin also insisted on the development of a universal cooperative movement "in which, of course, the real masses of the population participate. To give a bonus to the peasant who takes part in the cooperative turnover is a form that is absolutely correct, but at the same time to control this participation and its conscious character and its value--

that is the essence of the matter," he wrote in the article "The Cooperative Movement." In industry, however, the NEP architects were concerned primarily about encouraging foreign capital to invest in the Soviet economy, so as to penetrate the economic isolation, revive it and take advantage of the west's engineering-organizational progress. Thus they offered the western concerns licenses to extract crude oil in Baku, on very favorable terms. Permits for foreign trade and small-scale manufacture were issued on similar principles, treating them as a form of capitalistic economics, an indirect way, an auxiliary means "to go from precapitalist relations to socialism." Do, and to what degree, do the socioeconomic conditions and the international position of the only country at that time building socialism, not participating in the international division of law, fit the situation in Poland in 1983--a country which has a developed industry, an important economic potential and many large groups of highly skilled engineers, technicians and workers built up by the scientific-engineering potential? It is really difficult to overestimate the broad, actually unlimited, possibilities of drawing benefits from economic cooperation with countries in the socialist commonwealth. It cannot be ignored that the NEP policy was announced scarcely 3 years after the revolution, while Poland already has a history of almost 40 years in socialist building. In view of this, is the development of capitalistic forms of economy, under the circumstances that our country finds itself in, indispensable to the same degree as in Soviet Russia? Nor is it also so certain that development of state capitalism is a necessary condition for the country to overcome the economic, political and social crisis. Past experience does not confirm this certainty. After all, the fundamental reasons for the crisis were not inherent in the underdevelopment of the capitalist sector. Of course, they were inherent in the faulty system of managing the economy, in the domination of the directive system, and in the excessive and inefficient connections of our economy with the west. The prospects for our economics, therefore, lie in removing the causes of the crisis situation and not in creating additional strains and conflicts. Hence in accordance with the line of reform developed by the Ninth Congress we are modifying the mechanisms for controlling the economic life of the country in the direction of the domination of parametric systems and we have improved a system of economic incentives. Our economy must be redirected towards cooperation with the CEMA countries. Why is Kwiatkowski so sure that the development of a capitalistic sector is good for the working class or for socialism in our country? Is this not misleading? Would it not be better to simply admit that this "retreat" is the result of compromise, concessions to forces which accept the political system, yet in the socioeconomic sphere interested in the development of capitalistic, free-market economy enterprise? Political compromises are not a sin, particularly if they are justified, but we cannot make virtues of them.

2.

Kwiatkowski assures us that programmatically he is in favor of a pro-workers' orientation, of organizing "social life in accordance with the will and interests of the proletarian majority." And it is in this that he sees the chance for overcoming the crisis. It would be even better if he wanted to mention that these thoughts are not his discovery, for in this case he is no Columbus. It was precisely the party that he criticizes that loudly clamored for preferences for the interests of the working class, as it did, for example, in the campaign

prior to the Eighth Congress. The failure to give due consideration to the Leninist principles of democratic centralism by the leadership at that time made it difficult to correctly redirect party policy, to apply the indispensable socioeconomic and political reforms. It should also be remembered that this party, thrown into disarray by external anticommunist centers and internally by a revisionist-opportunistic and social-democratic-liberal coalition, still had enough strength to defend a Leninist, i.e., a workers' orientation, in the campaign prior to the Ninth Congress. If Kwiatkowski is not convinced as to this he should intently acquaint himself with the Congress resolution and the new PZPR statute. Therefore, there was a correct front in the party, a group of people able to develop and defend the Ninth Congress' line, which Kwiatkowski summarized not very successfully. And after all, this was not done by elves or aliens from outer space. This was the work of hundreds of thousands of PZPR activists who were in the party then and still are. It is they who constructed the workers' line of struggle and understanding, and it is they who are now stubbornly implementing this line.

Kwiatkowski suggests that there are divisions in the party. He even outlines the political fractions, but he does not clearly state whether or not there is a vulgar-economic fraction in the party. However, he clearly states that there is a so-called political sectarianism in the ranks of the PZPR. He rightly warns that "we must guard most vigilantly (...) against the advocates of technocratic reforms and, on the other hand, against the sectarian politicians from conservative circles." And further on he teaches a really extremely peculiar moral philosophy: "Both one and the other were necessary in the open struggle with the desperately attacking political opponents, since every day the question 'to be or not to be' was being settled. But the time has come to separate ourselves from those who think along those lines." I will not comment on this quotation.

However, one item must be explained. A party of the Leninist type should not have and should not now associate itself with the advocates of fractional activity. And totally unnecessarily the author of the very odd quotation renounces purges in the PZPR ranks. After outlining the program line at the Ninth Congress the party did a great deal to restore ideological unity in its ranks. I submit, on the basis of official estimates and from journalistic penetration, that the party ranks, from the ideological-political standpoint, are in good order, and that those who did not agree to observe statutory principles either resigned from the party themselves or were expelled by the authorities appointed for this purpose. Still, I learn from Kwiatkowski's article that this is not so, that the party is a field for fractional struggles, that "it is becoming apparent that an outside arbitrator is very much needed." It can be further presumed that the conflicts are fierce, that "sooner or later this would end with a defeat, and not just a personal one for the arbitrator." Therefore, the only way out of this situation, according to Kwiatkowski, is to bring about changes that will help "the workers attain an actually dominating position in the state." The prescription is rather vague.

Our party has developed a democratic mechanism for solving internal conflicts and attaining ideological-political unity. If there really are important differences in the party, and even--as Kwiatkowski suggests--intraparty struggles,

then there is nothing more simple than just to refer the matter to the appropriate party organ for investigation. But in that case the charges must be specific and reliably documented. In a party of the Leninist type, one must face the control commission of the applicable level when groundless charges are made.

Somewhat further on Kwiatkowski says, "The party may be able to come out of the crisis on the side of socialist democracy by organizing social life in accordance with the will and the interests of the proletarian majority. By bringing the wide masses into the government, by politicizing them, and re-evaluating the dictatorship of the proletariat." But questions arise: What force would ensure the domination of workers in the State, articulate the will and interests of the "proletarian majority," reevaluate the dictatorship of the proletariat? Kwiatkowski seems to suggest that this would be the "forces that are pro-worker oriented." Such an explanation says very little, is too ambiguous and enigmatic. In "The Childhood Disease of Leftism in Communism," Lenin stressed that: "Without a party that is steeled and tempered in struggle, without a party that has everyone's confidence, without a party that knows how to sense the attitudes of the masses and influence them, it is not possible to conduct a struggle effectively." It is also well to remember that Lenin unequivocally differentiated the characteristic interests of the workers from the interests of the working class, reminding that even the Christian Democratic unions are demanding the former, but the proletariat is able to fight for the latter only under the leadership and guidance of the communist party.

The matter of assessing whether the PZPR in its present state fulfills these requirements, is able to perform the vanguard role of the working class, remains. It appears from Kwiatkowski's conclusions that it is not. He mentions its weaknesses ("neglect in training cadre, faulty cadre policy, ideological disorientation"). Somewhere else he says that "instead of winning over people through a socialist perspective, attention is centered on discrediting the opponent." He also accuses the permanent, full-time party officials and cadres of the party's theoretical front of a great deal. Serious accusations, but groundless. Kwiatkowski evaluates from the position of a critic, and issues his criticisms in an extremely arbitrary manner. As if he came from another, obviously better, party.

It is difficult to polemicize with such evaluations. I did not conduct any pertinent studies and the author of the above evaluations does not refer to any authoritative analyses, either. Therefore, I must refer an arbitrator or readers interested in this matter to the collective wisdom of the party, accumulated primarily in the statutory resolutions of the party authorities, in which I personally have confidence. Because they were elected in a democratic way and thus constitute, during the inter-Congress period, no more or no less than an emanation of the party, called upon to formulate, through a democratic process, an evaluation of the state of the party. In the light of past assessments made, for example, by the PZPR Central Committee, Kwiatkowski's charges and accusations are unfounded. Naturally, the present state of the party ranks is not what would be called desirable. But the party is overcoming its inadequacies and shortcomings; it is strengthening its vanguard role. In any case, only the party can fulfill this role. And nothing and no one, from this standpoint, will replace even this mysterious "pro-worker oriented" force." If

the party, as a whole, is not sufficiently pro-worker oriented, then it is too bad that Kwiatkowski did not betray his secret and reveal who is more pro-worker oriented than the party. Kwiatkowski often makes use of Lenin's quotations, so I, too, will remind how this revolutionary theoretician and activist saw these matters: "Since there can be no talk about an independent ideology, developed by the working masses themselves during the very processes of their movement, then the problem is simply this: a bourgeois ideology or a socialist one. There is no middle ground here (because mankind has not developed a "third" ideology)..." The highest form of a class proletariat organization, Lenin taught, is a party "guided by a leading theory."

The PZPR fulfills this role better or worse, depending on many internal and external factors. But even the latest experience teaches that only this party is able to ensure that the will and interests of the working class are properly honored in state policy. Kwiatkowski should know this. I believe that the fullest guarantee of the fact that the party will fulfill its obligations to its own class is the consistent implementation of the Ninth Congress' program line, the strict implementation by all party elements of the duties ensuing from its leadership function to the state and guiding function in society.

3.

The author of "Impending Dangers and Prospects" may not know how long and how hard the road was which the party traversed since August 1980. He has a right to not know that the losses it suffered were too great to be made up from day to day. It will take time, persistence and consistency, an active stance by all party members in the struggle for the party's right to exist. To place responsibility for everything that is happening in the country's political life, for the party's activities, only on the permanent, full-time officials is incredible. It is the same as having these officials reach out for the laurel wreaths in the case of possible victory. Is it possible that Kwiatkowski does not know that, for example, there are more and much stronger centers which decide ideological and propaganda activity than the official functionaries of the party? Of course, I agree with the suggestion that an ideological-political and propaganda offensive is needed by the party across its entire front. Whether or not this takes place does not depend exclusively on the will of this group, the party activists, I believe. Incidentally, I wonder where this conviction about the exceptional role of the party apparatus comes from. After August this apparatus was accused, unjustly, in my opinion, of being responsible for all of the party's misfortunes. All kinds of functions were ascribed to it which it was supposed to have performed during the Gierk era. But from Kwiatkowski's arguments I suppose that here and there this point of view is still being held. Even though the new PZPR statute clearly defines the role, functions, duties and rights of the permanent party apparatus, as well as the procedures and professional-political, moral and ideological criteria by which the party authorities must be guided in engaging activists to work full-time in the party. All of this was clearly defined by the highest authority in the party. And the rest depends on the party committees which implement these decisions and execute the service role of the full-time officials in relation to the primary party organizations (POP) and the elected authorities.

The author is a very severe judge of the professional party workers. He says authoritatively that "the present apparatus consists primarily of party officials." After such a dictum the reader will "fill in" the rest. The author this assessment states: "Today's cadre of professional revolutionists will not be able to stand up to the opponents." And as the crowning proof he says that "they could not and did not have much to say in the face of the strike wave, were not able to win over the spontaneous workers' movement, lost with the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR) and the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), and demonstrated their militancy in secure positions, behind the backs of the forces of public law and order." He lumps together those who occupied permanent party positions, fulfilling functions after having been elected, as well as those who were engaged to work in the party through appointment. The former were delegated to work in the party by members of the party authorities, in order to fulfill their functions. Such a differentiation in this case is indispensable. I am omitting the fact that the present permanent cadre consists to a large degree of people engaged during the renewal period. It is another matter that the terms proposed to the newly engaged are not at all competitive, while the statutory requirements are highly inflated. But these are the problems of individual committees and let them worry about how to get people who comply with statutory requirements to work full-time in the party.

Let us return to Kwiatkowski's arguments. (The author will forgive the sharp expressions.) This is pure demagoguery. Less than 10,000 permanent workers were to quell the August explosion of protest, and win over the spontaneous movement? This is incredible. I do not know whether Kwiatkowski took part in the political struggle of that period. Anyone who had been a part of it would certainly not have put the matter in that way. Thanks to their cohesiveness, the permanent party workers together with the experienced social activists resisted the waves of the opponents' attacks, the explosion of discontent which also took place inside the party. From what I know about that period, the assessment of the militancy and ideological fervor of this group of activists looks entirely different. Often they were even left all alone in the discussion, which were frequently violent, and still many of them came out of these battles victorious. Kwiatkowski should know better than I that during this time they simply could not have demonstrated their militancy from "secure positions", because no one could ensure them such positions. And that they were not able to quell the wave of dissatisfaction is another matter entirely. One that is totally, I believe, irrespective of the qualifications and skills of these activists. We could ask: And who was able to do this? Those who decided to jump on this wave and ride on it? There were probably those too, acting in alliance with the architects of the horizontal structures. But most of the permanent activists, from what I know, conducted themselves with dignity and defended the party and its principles. And I think that justice was served when the present manager of the office of the Central Committee secretariat, Col B. Kolodziejczyk, in an interview with TRYBUNA LUDU, gave a completely different assessment of the qualifications, skills and ideological and moral stances of the permanent workers in the party committees.

Today, from the perspective of time and the class battles fought, we must say that a considerable part of the party apparatus played an important part in the

process of socialist renewal. Both prior to the declaration of martial law and during its duration, thousands of permanent party workers, veterans as well as a goodly number of new ones, defended the ideals of socialist Poland in the most advanced zones. (...) They were attacked by the antisocialist extreme, suffered petty persecutions and in many cases left entirely to their own resources. And yet they had the courage to stand up to all of the rumors that were circulating (...) True, some of them were not able to endure this great moral, and even physical, effort, and left the party. They were replaced by others (...) who under these unusual circumstances passed the test in the struggle, and proved themselves (...) both here (in the Central Committee) and in the local echelons I became acquainted with many fine, wise, experienced and dedicated workers in the party apparatus."

By the way, it is worth noting that most of the accusations directed at this group of activists came from the antisocialist groups and the advocates of the decentralized tendencies and political capitulation in the party. I think that this was not totally accidental, because the permanent activists, in general, defended socialism courageously and consistently. It is odd that such unfounded assessments were announced on the threshold of the reports-elections campaign. Undoubtedly, this will not make it easier for the permanent party functionaries to fulfill their service role during the campaign in behalf of the party and its primary elements and echelons. Incidentally, how can such critical generalizations be made regarding a relatively large group of activists?

4.

There is still one matter which cannot remain without argument. I am referring to the suggestion that the political struggle with the opponent be abandoned. Kwiatkowski argues that the opponent has already been defeated and that, according to the popular moral ethics, one should not kick a man who is already down. Yes, the opponent would like to have the party unilaterally announce a truce. Either generosity or naivete is expected from the leadership groups of the party. But the opponent is not at all weak and does not intend to surrender. Indeed, his strength has been sapped, but not enough so that a political struggle with him can be ended. Particularly since his propagandist and agitational activity is being transmitted by enemy broadcasting stations which are being universally heard--why try to hide this. If Kwiatkowski would take the trouble to answer the questions: why is the disregard for Marxism-Leninism not being properly rebuffed; why are there so few journalists who are unequivocally applying class interpretations to public events; why are there too few principled, militant speeches made at factory work-force meetings?--then perhaps he could somewhat more realistically estimate the forces of the opposition. Not because there are none that are willing, or that our comrades do not know enough. But because the political opponents continue to be able to effectively badger the people who, in identifying themselves with the party policy, come to its defense. That is what still happens frequently in scientific, artistic and opinion-forming circles, and also, although to a lesser extent, in the industrial circles.

As conditions change the enemy simply changes his tactics--attempts to erase his past and raises a hysterical outcry at every indication that his sphere of influence is being reduced. On this point I share the opinion of those who believe that it is still much too early to signal victory, that to abandon the political struggle is not at all justified, and actually harmful. Does this mean that at the same time we should not "win people over to the socialist cause?" This is a fake alternative, something on the order of: should one wash his hands, or only his feet?

9295

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EMIGRE PHILOSOPHER PREDICTS DEMISE OF COMMUNISM

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 16 Dec 83 pp 35-36

Interview of Leszek Kolakowski* by K. S. Karol; date and place not specified

Text/Question Events in Poland demonstrate that two years of repression have not succeeded in breaking Solidarity, which exists not only as an underground network, but especially as an element of worker consciousness and memory. It is now evident that the appearance of Polish trade unionists, because of their influence and implantation in the society at large, constitutes a phenomenon without precedent in the history of the Soviet bloc. In such conditions, is it conceivable that the idea of social compromise, of dialogue, proposed anew by Lech Walesa when awarded the Nobel peace prize, could in time impose itself on the regime? Then would there not be a model for transformation of all other Eastern countries?

Answer Yes indeed, Solidarity is an unprecedented phenomenon. From the start it was more than a trade union, but it was not a political party, since Solidarity did not propose structures aimed at replacing the state apparatus. It was a broad civic movement which came to concentrate all social, economic, national, and cultural claims of Polish society--of all social strata except the privileged group of the political, military and police apparatus. Solidarity wished to wrest from the regime a few sectors of social, cultural and economic life, and in part restore to them the rights of civil society. A compromise with the regime was conceivable, but it would have produced a new regime, a hybrid type in which communist power would have coexisted with organizations institutionally independent of it and exercising, moreover, a certain control over the governmental machinery. In a word, we would then have been on the way to partial expropriation of the privileged class. But it takes two to make a compromise, and the regime clearly did not want to.

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From the first, its intention has been to destroy autonomous forces, and so to eliminate Solidarity--and at the first opportunity. After the massive rape of 13 December 1981 it is hard to imagine a return to a situation of compromise in Poland. Since then, hate has built up enormously, and the regime does much to increase it ("the dialogue of the stick with the buttocks," as a proverb says). Surely you know that Solidarity members are at times assassinated by persons unknown; that the secret police can beat or massacre almost anyone with impunity.

Despite that, I do not despair. Solidarity has undeniably driven a wedge in the Soviet world, and thereby symbolized a possible model for the future. All that has happened since that 13 December must be seen--certainly--as the defeat of a liberation movement, but above all as an important element in the decomposition of Sovietism; as a process which has laid bare not only the strength but also the incurable weaknesses of Sovietism. And I have no doubt on this point: its maladies are so obviously fatal that the regime is headed towards disintegration.

Question The analogy between Solidarity and conventional labor movements, suggested by the content of the Gdansk agreements and by the social composition of the Polish movement, gives cause for reflection on the forms of aid the West can bring to Polish militants. More precisely, the question is whether the Western tradition of a century of worker struggles, which in one way or another claimed kinship with socialism, can provide arms or rallying cries to Solidarity in its fight to change "true socialism."

Answer You are aware that the aid brought to Solidarity by trade unionists from several countries--Americans, Frenchmen, and Italians--has played and still plays a large role in the resistance movement. If, as you do, we wish for a closer ideological communion between the Polish antitotalitarian resistance and Western socialist movements--and of course I am thinking of democratic socialists, and not of those who dream of a Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban socialism--then we are in a quandary. For the aims of actual or potential resistance in the countries of the Soviet empire are clear: they are to restore democratic institutions and national independence. In the West, by contrast, we are at an impasse: if indeed socialism is not Sovietism, does the word still have an identifiable content. Does it mean expanding the welfare state within the market economy? Does it mean continuing Keynesianism? Nowhere in this is there an idea which could form a link between workers in the East and those in the West.

Question You yourself have said in a recent interview that socialism is not the promise of an ideal system able to solve all man's problems, but rather a movement inspired by the will to take responsibility for the oppressed and exploited. Can we then identify with them if we neglect their ideological inheritance and broadest aspirations?

Answer Yes, for me the socialist tradition, insofar as I join it, is a matter of will rather than the dream of a society without conflict or evil, a society of boundless bliss. Socialism, as you well know, has very di-

verse roots. There is Marxism, of course, with its totalitarian potential which indeed was clearly perceived by contemporaries of Marx without waiting for the Russian revolution. But if joining the socialist tradition means wanting to build a "socialist society," we must once again define our terms. To be on the side of the oppressed and the wretched does not imply a naive faith in a future filled with song.

However, when ideologically committed socialists are pressed to say what they want, not as mere partial reforms like changes in tax rates or health services, but in terms of a "new society," we note that in the end they have the same solution for all the world's ills: nationalization. And since to nationalize everything means to nationalize human beings, and also the means of information and communication, that solution is nothing less than Sovietism. For others, the universal panacea is worker self-management. If we think seriously about true self-management, we see it would end up as 19th century economic liberalism with all its harmful effects, since complete autonomy of productive units--supposing it were possible--would set in operation the normal laws of competition. And polemics are useless against the old leftist adolescents who promise us that as soon as they are in power perfect self-management and total planning will reign, the market will be abolished, freedom will be boundless, and so forth.

Question Some people think--on the basis of the Italian PC's evolution, for example--that from now on the possibility exists of a return by the Western workers' movement to the position it held prior to the great schism set off in the 1920's by the Third International. In such a hypothesis, what would be the impact of that change in eastern Europe, and more particularly in the USSR?

Answer I do not think it possible to restore the ethos or the organizational and ideological patterns of the 19th century European workers' movement. First, because of obvious changes in the social stratification and position of workers, and secondly because we face world problems to which the ideals of the past century provide no answers. The most abominable forms of oppression and misery in the world have little relation to the social problems and demands of the working class in times past. We do not have available the conceptual tools--and still less the common solutions--to enable us to deal at the same time with Ugandan children dying of starvation, Christians rotting for their faith in Soviet concentration camps, people bludgeoned by police in a junta-ruled country of south America, Cambodians massacred by Communist "liberators," defenseless victims perishing in African tribal wars, and the unemployed in Britain as well. We only have certain fundamental and traditional values which govern our reactions, but I do not see how to translate them into a political movement of worldwide aspirations. If someone knows the way to do that, I would like to learn it.

Regarding changes in Communist movements within democratic countries, and particularly in Italy, it is preferable, of course, for that movement to show more rather than less respect for democratic values. But without a fundamental ideological revision those changes will remain ambiguous and

dubious. I can well understand why Italian Communist leaders cannot allow themselves to break away frankly from their Soviet and Leninist ties. If they did so, we wonder how they would differentiate themselves from social-democrats. But as long as they do not, and as long as they imply that Sovietism--though not without defects--still represents "historical progress" in relation to "bourgeois" democracy, and continue to consider themselves members of the same Communist movement of which the Soviets are another segment, the barriers will remain difficult to cross. True, the Poles are grateful to those Italian Communists who took a friendly position towards Solidarity. But you cannot stop the Poles from feeling revulsion when they see the hammer and sickle--for us, symbols of Soviet oppression--in the streets of Italian cities. The disintegration of world Communism is no doubt a good sign, but its ideological meaning is not without ambiguity.

Question You have long claimed, and events in Poland have proven you right, that totalitarian societies are not immutable, that "internal pressure" compels them to change, and that they have a certain "elasticity" which must be allowed for. To all appearances, that elasticity is greater in the popular democracies than in the USSR. Does that not show that transformation of that empire is coming about, first of all, through diversification of its periphery, and that Poland is in this respect an element of first importance?

Answer Despite all indications, I do not think totally rigid systems in fact exist, and we cannot know in advance what are the limits of elasticity of the Soviet despotism. It is clear that if they can change they can do so only under duress, and that it is vain to hope for a conversion to democracy on the part of the landlords of the Soviet empire. Compulsion means social pressure as well as the imperatives of an extremely sick economy. The Polish experiment, we had hoped, could open a path to peaceful non-explosive changes in that oppressive regime. I do not think that path is barred, despite the massive violence brought to bear to snuff out the will to resistance. For the present, we have no other path open to us than to exert that pressure.

It is true that Communism would not long survive in Poland without the threat of Soviet tanks, and that it was imposed by violence on the countries of central Europe, while it imposed and maintains itself in the USSR through purely internal forces. The novelist Alexander Zinoviev thinks the system has really succeeded in making "the new socialist man," that is, a puppet without will, ignorant, xenophobic, passive, and in the end almost satisfied, or at least unaware that life can be different from the one he knows. Zinoviev further thinks Communism spreads like a cancerous tissue, which replaces the differentiated cells of an organism by identical cells. But the cancer can live only as a parasite; if it succeeds in devouring the organism, the cancerous tissue cannot itself survive.

Of course, I cannot pretend to know Sovietism as Zinoviev does. I note, however, that his pessimism is exceptional among Russians opposed to the regime. A very slight softening, in the 1950's, was enough to allow the cul-

tural forces killed off by Stalinism to rise again suddenly from nothing. And what is more, they are still there, despite all the persecutions, and are seeking every possible path, in the wake of the destruction of the dissident intellectual movement.

The Soviet empire is torn by all sorts of tensions--social, national, economic, and cultural--which it can in no way remedy, not to mention struggles within the establishment. It is not unthinkable that these tensions could contribute to gradual disintegration of Sovietism, but we can only speculate on conceivable scenarios for that disintegration. It goes without saying that for the people of that unhappy country, and for the rest of the world as well, a nonexplosive disintegration would be the most desirable. For in the end such a regime, threatened from within, can always seek to save itself through war. Moreover, we have known since Tocqueville that a despotic regime puts itself at greatest risk when it seeks to liberalize itself: instead of appeasing its malcontents, it may encourage them, and set in motion the growing pressure which will destroy it. Let us not then prophesy. It is enough to repeat that for people in Communist countries who wish to fight, there is no other way under present conditions than non-violent resistance, in the uncertain hope that a combination of social pressures and economic ills will be able to act effectively against barbarism.

Question Official ideology in the USSR is now nothing more than a simple rhetoric to confer legitimacy on the regime, but it has no real hold on the collective mind. The crisis of Marxism-Leninism thus constitutes an essential element of the Soviet crisis itself: of the weak motivation of its citizens, and of its economic stagnation. You know, moreover, that an ideological vacuum cannot exist, and is soon filled by other ideas. But--in your own words--you do not wish changes in the USSR to begin with Jewish pogroms in Kiev or a massacre of Russians in Tashkent. Can one imagine--and can we contribute--to a change which would not go through the stage of an exploding nationalism?

Answer I would wish, obviously, that we might avoid nationalistic passions becoming the major factor in the decomposition of Sovietism. The crisis of legitimacy you mention--and which results from the death of that grotesque ideology called Marxism-Leninism--also has its dangers. Though still put to use in the official jargon, that ideology is giving ground little by little to a syncretic ideology which absorbs Russian nationalism, racism, antisemitism, and xenophobia as more reliable instruments capable of providing more communication between the regime and the society. Nationalisms appear to be the most powerful disintegrating force. I do not say that pleases me--quite the opposite. Nationalism, even if well justified, becomes barbarous if it rules out all other ideas.

Question In 1947, at the outset of the Cold War, Andrei Zhdanov declared that all questions, even the most secondary, came down in the end to deciding whether one was "for or against the USSR." Today, because of indignation against the real or trumped up fear of Soviet imperialism, the same

question is sometimes heard in the West, but with an answer manifestly contrary to that of Zhdanov. Nevertheless, is there not resurgence of a Manichaeanism which would culminate in an unhealthy polarization of the world?

Answer It would certainly be stupid to maintain that all tensions, all social and national struggles in the world are due to Soviet manipulations, and that they would miraculously disappear if that influence did not exist. Still, it is true that the Soviets strive to use and manipulate all struggles and tensions to enlarge their sphere of dominance, and that in our world it is very difficult to avoid involvement in big power conflicts. Difficult, perhaps, but not impossible. The world should not be seen exclusively as the sealed-off arena of a struggle between Soviet despotism and Western democracy, as if there were nothing else. That being said, the question of how to avoid world war must have priority in our political reactions, and we must not lose sight of the fact that Sovietism represents the most powerful source of that danger. Think of this simple fact: since the end of World War I, for 65 years, there have been innumerable wars, on all scales and in every corner of the world. But never throughout that era has there been a war opposing democratic countries to each other. It is despotism, in our time, that engenders war.

So then, no, we do not want "polarization" of the world, but the opposite, that is, compromise. Still I repeat: it takes two to compromise, and the Soviets have hardly learned that art. They have no allies, but only vassals or enemies, and they want nothing else. For them, the world is and will remain in a constant state of war for as long as it is not wholly dominated by Communism. Such is the pure Leninist idea. War in the strict sense, "hot" war, is for them but another form of the class struggle, the difference being but technical (Lenin, on that point, was fond of quoting Clausewitz). I do not know if they really think they will one day succeed in conquering the world; there is little probability they have specific plans to that end. But their ideology, in its crudeness, certainly cannot do without that hope.

Supposing they dominated the entire world except Iceland, they would still be victims of "imperialist encirclement." Continental empires disintegrate if they do not expand. But here again I refuse to give up hope for a non-explosive decomposition of Sovietism. Without that hope, our only choice would be between the horrors of a world war and Soviet domination of the world, and either choice would lead only to the death of humanity as we know it.

6145
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ACTIVITIES OF NEW STUDENT ASSOCIATION EVALUATED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 10, Oct 83 pp 127-132

[Article by Cezary Droszcz: "Problems--Discussions; First Year's Activity of Polish Students' Association"]

[Text] The past turbulent 3-year period marking the greatest crisis in the post-war history of Peoples' Poland has had an influence on extensive changes in the student movement.

Already in September 1980 new student organizations started to emerge, thereby breaking the Socialist Union of Polish Students' [SZSP] monopoly operating in the colleges--an ideological-political organization in existence since 1973, carrying on the traditions of progressive student activity in Poland. The political character of newly forming student structures as well as their influence in the community were diverse; from a leftist trend represented by the Polish Socialist Youth Union [ZSMP] and the Rural Youth Union [ZMW] to a positively antisocialist trend, directly affiliated with the political and radical opposition of Solidarity personified by the Independent Association of Students [NYS]. The new organizations united from dozens of individuals up to a significant portion (approximately 15 percent) of the community. College life was dominated by strikes during the entire year of 1981, beginning with the Lodz strike up to strikes incited by the issue of the Engineering College in Radom. These conflicts certainly had their academic basis, but also as a general rule they reflected and intensified tension throughout the land. In fact, precisely they, and not basic problems and student interests, expressed that which was happening during those months in the colleges, in the student movement.

Open political struggle became the key issue. Its demand dictated priorities, shaped the actual course of events, the form of the student movement. For the first time in their 20-odd years of life, classmates of the same age from the group confronted one another with various views, various postures and various insignia of the student organization.

Nevertheless, the Socialist Union of Polish Students notwithstanding its engagement in political activities, did not capitulate but patiently, consistently, continued sociovital activities on behalf of the student body.

It displayed concern over the assurance of adequate conditions for work and rest during the 1982 vacation period. However, in these activities the SZSP stood alone. In view of basic political differences and ideological priorities, the Independent Association of Students not only did not advocate creation of a uniform student front in professional matters concerning all students (the scholarship system, health care matters) but opposed all offers of cooperation. This led to the outright doctrinal principle of intolerance and antagonism. The entire community bore the cost of this policy. This also had an effect on disintegration and intensified division in the dean's group, the faculty, the community.

The state of affairs in colleges underwent a basic change following December 1981. Student organizational activities were suspended and subsequently the NZS was dissolved. The state of affairs prior to December had and continues to have its consequences in the continuation of fundamental lines of political division and diversity of ideological motivation.

The year 1982 was a period of model discussion, deliberations and controversies concerning the profile of the student movement. The discussion, although conducted chiefly among activists of the SZSP, also embraced the active of cultural and tourist institutional departments and self-governing movements; participating in it, although certainly to an unsatisfactory degree, were a number of disorganized students. As a result of this discussion in November 1982, the SZSP was dissolved and the Association of Polish Students [ZSP] was created. Tadeusz Sawic, chairman of the SZSP, based this decision on the following: "The all-important issue was and remains the continuation of the autonomous and socialist student movement, as well as the implementation of the right of students to all forms of intellectual and social activity, and also to joint decisionmaking regarding the life of the college and our country.

"The duty of the student movement and also its credibility is the ability to lead the community, ability to organize and inspire its activities, effectiveness, defense of its independence and social interests, and also shaping of postures as well as values essential to the country. We have recognized that in the current state of community affairs existing structures do not and cannot completely fulfill these functions and duties.

"The student community is politically and philosophically heterogeneous. During the past 2 years these differences have been distinctly intensified. Therefore, it is essential today to adapt the profile of the student movement to the pluralistic character of the community.

"The ZMW as well as the ZSMP have launched their activities on college campuses. There followed a coalition of the SZSP formula with some kind of new environment, with the realities of the community.

"In view of the disintegration of the community and the sector, in contemplation of future Polish intellectuals, it is necessary to create conditions for their social integration and cooperation."

The creation of the Polish Student Association was an occurrence traceable to the autonomous decision of the student community. Delegates to the founder's congress, and they came not only from the SZSP but also from the student cultural movement, scientific circles, sporting and tourist clubs, did not represent the community in its entirety. However, they were representatives of the most significant portion of this society—of practically all of today's active groups of the student community.

In the adopted documents of the ZSP, it was stated that it intends to represent and defend, within the framework of its program, the interests of the organization's members in all spheres of the life of the colleges and the nation. The goal of the ZSP is the struggle for full implementation of this program on the basis of mutual activity and participation in college administration. Its task is also the molding of active postures, the introduction of conditions for creative development of the sector, utilization of the intellectual potential of college youth. The organization of young intellectuals wishes to fight for its true place and role in the social structure of the socialist country, as well as to express itself on national and state issues, to present its opinions on social and economic practices independently.

How can one evaluate the activities of the Association of Polish Students after not 1 full year since it began to function? Are the assumed goals realized?

In the first place, it must be stated that the decisions of the founder's congress and the federation itself have not enjoyed an enthusiastic reception on the part of the student body (on the other hand, they found harsh judges in the opposition camp, not only the collegiate), because a considerable portion of this youth introduces views that are remote from the principles of party programs as well as functioning youth organizations. As was demonstrated in the survey "Sociopolitical Awareness of the Youth Under Martial Law Conditions in Poland," conducted in May and June 1982 under the supervision of J. Gesicki and G. Nowacki of the Institute for Research on Youth, a portion of those interviewed opposed socialism as a "non-humanitarian political system," criticizing its alleged lack of concern for the individual as well as its restrictions of liberty and individual freedom. A considerable number of young people approved the principles of idealistically understood socialism, completely consistent with theoretical assumptions from which there can be no departures.

Bronislaw Golembiowski, in his work "The Social Value of Youth," observed that following the crisis from 1980 to the present moment, impulsive emotional indications of sedition are increasing in the young people's community. Their growth is based on inefficiency and the lack of opportunities to apply innovative concepts of reform previously presented. Interrupted, unrealized reform aspirations of the youth lead to the formation of attitudes of passivity, indifference. Discouragement and the feeling of generation ties are two traits most distinctly characteristic of young Poles. The opportunities for returning to postures of reform can be created by rapid and complete removal of the blockade, and causes persuading the individual to rebel.

Grzegorz Nowacki, in an interview for ZYCIE WARSZAWY, does not rule out the possible emergence of antisocialist postures in our situation. This should be opposed primarily by real ideological-educational work. Maintaining honest intensive dialogue with young people is indispensable; furthermore, it must be remembered that whatever will be offered as the one and only interpretation will be rejected by young people.

The young generation of Poles does not wish to accept socialism as an absolute manifestation of the historical process, but rather as a social reality that can be coauthored and changed. V. Lenin anticipated this 60 years ago, writing that the youth "...naturally must arrive at socialism in a different manner, not the way nor in the form nor under the circumstances that their fathers did."

The youth strongly feels the need for subjectivity and participation in the political life of the nation, the need to make decisions not only in their own affairs, but also regarding more important social problems; studies that have been conducted confirmed this. However, young people are full of apprehension about their future, about the kind of systems-type solutions whose foundations are formed in Poland today and display distrust regarding legally existing institutions. They regard as most essential limitations on their independence by the "adult" generation which has monopolized influences on the most important elements in the political system of society, but likewise lack of opportunity for full political expression within the framework of youth organizations currently functioning.

It is also necessary to stress the enormous discrimination of youth with respect to material status as well as possibilities for development or access to education.

Under these circumstances the most urgent task of the ZSP, besides building its own structures, was the stimulation of community activities, motivation to constructive behavior, to the assumption by the students of responsibility for their own destiny and that of the entire community, and ultimately the endeavor to unify the greatest number of students possible within the organization.

The ZSP, in keeping with community expectations, joined in compiling executive decrees to a bill regarding the college educational system and employment. A subject of interest to the organization were the decrees of the Council of Ministers pertaining to the student community; it likewise joined in discussions on a draft of the passport bill and the bill regarding young people.

The association initiated a broadly conceived economic endeavor. Thanks to financial assistance, quite a large number of ZSP students could take vacations, and the young people starting their studies could take part in so-called orientation camps. The following academic campaigns were crowned with success: "Krakow," "Chełm," "Przemysl" and "Trzcianka," which produced substantial social and educational results.

ZSP programmatic activity in various spheres is not yet finalized. Student culture should be added to the spheres in which this activity is substantial. Programmatic proposals, forms of patronage, and especially new organizational solutions fell on favorable grounds, aroused interest in the association which, however, still does not imply the integration of this community with the organization. The FAMA festival of student culture at Swinoujscie, which had been restored following a 5-year lull, provided a test of ZSP potential and simultaneously a barometer of its influence in the community of culture. "Without stars but with prospects"--this was how TRYBUNA LUDU described this exhibition of 600 participants, which included many young people taking the first step--quite a lot indeed.

The situation in the tourist sphere appears relatively satisfactory. "Almatur," performing efficiently, by and large renewed its domestic and foreign contacts. In spite of domestic financial difficulties, vacation offers are liberal and the fees are reasonable.

A firm joint venture with the association for a sports center was successfully concluded. It is difficult to estimate how much influence ZSP programmatic proposals and abilities had on this, and how much was attributed to the sporting tradition exhibited in the guise of its patron. Cooperation with the Student Sports Union continues to improve. The unswerving work being conducted by the entire ZSP aktiv is producing results in academic groups, clubs, circles and student homes.

A vigorous foreign campaign made it possible for the ZSP to renew its presence in the international arena, thereby contributing to overcoming Poland's isolation. Deserving of special attention is the fact that it maintains an eminent position in the International Student Union and signed a letter of understanding for cooperation with the Lenin Komsomol.

An important element in ZSP endeavors is its concern with improving the material conditions of student life, as well as the creation of better a life start and professional possibilities for college graduates. The new system of material assistance continues to arouse much controversy. In the opinion of the association, this assistance should be extended to the most needy students, to afford them a normal education. Scholarships must provide equal possibilities for individuals coming from families with various incomes.

A bill regarding employment for graduates was prepared with ZSP participation. The mechanisms released by this decree can have various consequences. However, it is certain that only active, capable and resourceful graduates will have an opportunity to gain satisfactory employment.

In spite of financial problems the association organized an extensive summer health-care campaign for students. Initiatives connected with the struggle against addiction to drugs, alcoholism, etc., are important.

The association, in defense of the interests of the student community, tries to view it in the broad context of general social problems. There are difficulties associated with this, because it requires a solution within the organization to the conflict between the interests of the student and general social interests. Therefore, broader concepts are necessary; a fuller ZSP social program is irrevocable.

Intellectual activity was extremely inferior in the first phase of the association's construction. In the near future, subject matter devoted to the position of the intelligentsia in society, to its role in overcoming various manifestations of social crises, to the position and role of the college in the overall educational process of the young person, to college prospects and to the system of society's representation, will undergo broader treatment.

The ZSP concluded the first 10 months of its existence with 27,000 members, with a fully formed structure in all Polish colleges, as well as with new experiences in the implementation of a formula for socioprofessional organization.

In the new academic year qualitatively new assignments are presenting themselves to the ZSP.

The most important of these pertains to overcoming the low level of activity in the student community. The ZSP program in work circles referred to as "Activists for the Future," should serve this cause. Included in the first group of assignments is the necessity of convincing members of the association, students, of the fact that the anticipated changes, reforms and also the fulfillment of the ZSP program will not be feasible without personal participation, mutual creation of reality by us personally, assumption of partial responsibility for the destiny of the country and society.

The association functions in the community of the young intelligentsia, which has potential influence on the transformation of social awareness, participates in managing people, operations, the economy. Whoever has the future in mind must consider the need to prepare succeeding generations of managing cadres, initiators of the party program. Basic expectations regarding the ZSP, as practically the only actual force in the academic community with a broad profile of activity, are inclusion of the association in resolving many socioeconomic and educational problems, and endeavors on behalf of an educational system (supplementing this system with organizational activity) in which college graduates would not only be professionals, but likewise cognizant of their role as managers and leaders of social groups. Also in this regard, the special duty of supporting the policy of the PZPR rests on the ZSP.

Higher education in past years reflected unstable teaching methods, an unstable training system, unstable study rules. This must cause concern, for it takes place in a community associated with education and progress.

The association will initiate a discussion in the community concerning reform in education, training methods, teaching programs, lecture standards, organization of the didactic process, and will address itself to problems submitted by the community, creating at the same time a vision of the modern school efficiently managed, of the university of the year 2000, which will fulfill the function of the social university popularizing science, technology and national culture, and contributing to the uninterrupted educational advancement of Poles. The socialist college program must be flexible and eliminate archaic structures and schemata. Modern didactics should release among the students assiduous attitudes towards acquired knowledge, create the habit of continuing education, the skill of combining theory and practice. The association does not only feel jointly responsible for the educational system, but is likewise preparing specific proposals for changes in college didactics; it will strive for improved fulfillment of educational functions by colleges and has already begun work on its own educational model.

The new academic year will be the beginning of the next phase for the ZSP. A shift will be required from building structures and organizing internal operations to a programmatic offensive encompassing all spheres of ZSP activities. Certainly this will not be easy. Nevertheless, the fact must be optimistically approached that with normalization of the situation in the country, and implementation of the resolutions of the Ninth PZPR Congress it will be easier to reach decisions concerning the young people with the ZSP program, and find understanding for organizational initiatives. At the same time this places greater responsibility on the ZSP aktiv.

What does the future hold for the student community and the Association of Polish students? What will Poland be like tomorrow and the day after?

That, to an increasing degree, depends on us personally.

9951

CSO: 2600/459

TYPICAL DAY IN ARMY COMPANY DESCRIBED

Opole TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 7 Oct 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by Zdzislaw Adamiec: "A Soldier Has No Time To Be Bored. One Day Spent With a Company"]

[Text] I decided to spend one whole day with the soldiers of a company of the 10th Sudety Armored Division named after heroes of the Soviet Army. It was a very interesting day in every respect. The weather kept changing all day and the soldiers' tasks also varied.

Let us look at such a day.

In the evening it had already begun to rain. It poured all night and just before dawn.

0545 hrs--outside the window it is dark, just before dawn. The squad leaders are waking up. They have 10 minutes to get ready "for the day." They wash and shave in a hurry. There are 5 minutes left for discussion of the morning's physical training course.

0600 hrs--the duty NCO's announce reveille for everybody. Today the announcement is made by Cpl Miron Ignasiak, Cpl Jerzy Majewski and Bombardier Bogdan Matyszok, among others in the company. Though outside it is still raining and dark no one is reluctant to start. But the physical training does not go smoothly. One must run 3 kilometers at a quick pace. Some people complain (but very softly) under their breath. Foreheads are wet--from sweat or rain, nobody knows.

After the physical training--washing, shaving, making beds. At 0655 hrs everybody must be ready for breakfast.

0700 hrs--soldiers go to breakfast, singing and marching in step. Mushroom soup is already steaming. There is also bread with butter and coffee with milk. It is necessary to eat quite a lot because dinner is a long time off and lunch is only an appetizer. Another 10 minutes left for cleaning the rooms.

0740 hrs--punctually, all the soldiers are standing at attention at the battalion roll-call. The plan for the whole day is announced. From here everyone goes to his own work, which begins at 0810 hrs.

Says 2nd Lt Edward Koscienkow, deputy political officer in this detachment:

"The political lesson on the subject 'Principles of the Polish People's Republic's Foreign Policy' will last 2 hours--these classes are led by chiefs of political instruction groups. First films will be shown, then there will be discussion about them. The draft of this subject was designed for 4 hours of instruction but we covered half of it during the last field exercises."

Edward Koscienkow has been in the military since 1978. After completion of secondary school in Kedzierzyn-Kozle he was wondering about what he could do. One day he decided to join the military. So he found himself at the Poznan Armored Troops Higher School. Later on he came to Opole, where the first year of his service he was a platoon commander. That year was a very good lesson in life and the lot of a soldier for him.

1000 hrs--classes are coming to an end in classrooms. In a corridor I met Miron Ignasiak, who is duty NCO for today.

"I will be discharged from the service in half a year," he says. "I am from Kortoszyn. I graduated from the Agriculture Technical School and come from a peasant family. After military I want to have my own farm, I want to get married. I took up duty yesterday at 1800 hrs and finished today at the same time. Everything is OK."

1030 hrs--lunch is almost finished (a roll with luncheon meat, coffee, apples). On the parade ground--short instruction in work safety and hygiene, and in activities which must be performed with their vehicles.

October is an extremely important month in units of this type. This month is spent on a general inspection and service of the equipment. In October the transition from summer to winter takes place. Oil must be changed and other repairs must be done. Vehicles which returned from the field late in September need special attention. These are the vehicles the soldiers start working on.

Tarpaulins are falling off the vehicles and all kinds of tools are being used.

Near one of the vehicles I meet a driver, Stanislaw Kotek, a gunner, Roman Prudlo, and two rangers, Leszek Poplawski and Krzysztof Ilnicki. We started to chat. They joined the military at different times. Mr Prudlo is from Olesno and he will be the first one of them to be discharged. Pvt Poplawski has been in the military only since last spring. A youngster, he is still a tankman.

They say that it was not bad in the field. Probably it will be worse to service the equipment for a whole month. Fine, but it is obvious that vehicles they have under supervision must be 100 percent efficient, 100 percent of the time, day or night.

Finally I ask how they like the army pea soup.

"Ours is the best," they answer almost in unison and Stanislaw Kotek says with expertise that meals are excellent when an old cook is on duty.

No more than 5 minutes were left when I met Cpl Kazimierz Aleksandrowicz. He is the one who is in charge of the mess hall today. Should the soup get burnt or should there be too many eyes on the potatoes, he will pay for it.

"What's for dinner today?"

"Tomato soup, roast, salad and compote. Everyone should be satisfied and I, fortunately, am going off duty," K. Aleksandrowicz says jokingly.

1500 hrs--Singing and in step the troops go for tomato soup and roast. Then till 1610 hrs they have time off for rest. Later I will become convinced that during the workday these are the only minutes when a soldier can indulge in yawning, because at:

1615 hrs--everyone goes back to the machinery or to the classrooms. Some are cleaning and maintaining rifles, pistols. Others enrich themselves in political and cultural activities or work in the youth organization.

Krzysztof Capala is from Wroclaw. There he completed the Post-High School Vocational Study Program, then NCO school. He works in the military as a photographer. He says to me:

"I consider myself a quiet corporal. I prefer gaining respect and trust by my personality, not by manifestation of my higher rank. I did not have any difficult moments with soldiers."

He did not say, out of modesty, that he is a squad leader; this I later learned from 2nd Lt Koscienkow. The second lieutenant told me also about the extensive cooperation between soldiers of the "Tenth" and school students, factories and other establishments.

1840 hrs--work comes to an end; washing, formation.

1900 hrs--soldiers are marching to supper. There is fresh bread with lard, and cucumbers. Appetites are great because the day was strenuous.

1930 hrs--evening TV news begins, all detachments are sitting down in their club rooms. After the news there is time off. Those who are behind in their cleaning duty must do it now. Some write letters.

2130 hrs--taps, roll call, some organizational reminders. Some soldiers are already yawning, others still "carrying on."

2200 hrs--the troops are asleep.

12444

CSO: 2600/498

NATIONAL MODEL OF SOCIALISM CRITICIZED

Warsaw TU I TERAZ in Polish No 1, 4 Jan 84 p 3

/Article by Edward Modzelweski/

/Text/ The problem of the universal laws and specific conditions of building socialism in Poland arises every so often in our press, always causing discussion and controversy. Disputes in this matter usually concern comprehension of the relation between what is universal and what is specific (national) in the building of socialism. Less often they concern the meaning of the concepts behind this relations.

In other words, the participants in such disputes when quarreling over the proper ratio of the universal and the national in the process of building socialism in Poland, seldom realize the need to explicate these two categories and usually more use of them in an arbitrary manner. This of course, leads to a number of misunderstandings and consequently to wrong conclusions.

I believe that this is the case with Wojciech Sokolewicz's article "Socialism in Poland or Polish Socialism" in issue No 47 of TU I TERAZ.

Reflecting on socialism in Poland, W. Sokolewicz writes "...is it possible to speak in general of Polish socialism, or is it sufficient to consider the nature of the socialism being realized in Poland? The difference is fundamental. In the first case one assumes the existence of individual features of this socialism, which are inherent in at least some social relations, including organization and methods of exercising authority; in the second case the individual features should appear in forms that take into account so-called national peculiarities, and should only concern details. In the first case the individual features would be of a permanent and programmatic nature and would be expressed in goals as well as in the means employed to achieve them; in the second case, it would be necessary to accept the universality of the goal and the more or less temporary nature of individual means. Moreover...the greater their significance is, the more desirable it would be...to eliminate individuality in the relatively near future." In another place the author states: "There is no doubt that Polish socialism will fully take into account the general laws of socialism..."

applying and adapting them to the situation in our country." In still another place, we can read that so-called Polish socialism will gain public support only when it has a predominance of individualism over collectivism, which will necessitate a "shift of emphasis in the socialist value system together with an acknowledgment of the general principles of socialism."

From the above remarks (and from other assertions in this article), we can deduce the following line of reasoning:

1. There exist general laws of socialism, the essence of which is universality of the goal.
2. There are certain specific features of Polish society, which arise from its ethnic, cultural, political and other traditions.
3. Between the general laws of socialism and the specific features of Polish society there are contradictions, which appear not only in means but also in goals.
4. These contradictions are the reason for failures in the building of socialism in our country.
5. The prerequisite for eliminating these failures is the realization of so-called Polish socialism or the so-called model of Polish socialism.

The author's line of reasoning is also based on the correct but not explicitly stated assumption that socialism is a necessity. It is difficult, however, to find in the text of the article any clearcut justifications for this assumption. Thus the sentence "Polish socialism must under no circumstances lead to a weakening of ties with our allies" may suggest the thesis that the necessity of socialism in our country arises from so-called geopolitical considerations, whereas another, previously cited sentence, "There is no doubt that Polish socialism will fully take into account the general laws of socialism..." suggests in turn that this necessity of socialism may arise from the "good will" of the ruling elite.

I believe that neither the first nor the second nor any other justification for the development of socialism in Poland that can be deduced from W. Sokolewicz's article is correct. The necessity of socialism and its development cannot be explained either by teleological or by axiological premises.

The only sensible, Marxist approach to this problem is to accept the thesis that socialism and its development are a historical necessity manifested in and realized by the revolutionary movement of the working class. This thesis may sound very schoolbookish, but at least two conclusions arise from it. First, that this process is objective in nature, i.e., in the final analysis it is realized not by the notions

of individual people, the lofty intentions of intellectuals or the "good will" of political parties, but by the working class movement (the August /1980/ motto of workers' protest--"socialism yes, distortions no!"--bears out this conclusion perfectly). Second, this process is not haphazard, i.e., the working class movement develops according to certain general laws.

There is no space here to elaborate upon and justify this thesis, but one thing is certain: it has definite consequences for an understanding of what we call the universal laws of socialism. Without acceptance of this thesis, all reflections on the development of socialism lose their meaning. Perhaps the author is willing to accept with such a formulation, but if so, the line of reasoning in the article contradicts it.

Why? In recognizing socialism and its development as a historical necessity, one cannot subsume its general laws--as the author does--in the category of "universality of the goal." To be sure, in the common understanding of the universal laws of socialism there is surely an element of purpose, especially when one understands by this universality the ethical elements of the system; however, when one is studying socialism as a historical process, to speak of these laws in goal-related categories assumes that they exist outside this process and thus outside of history and society. This is how the author formulates them when he writes, for example, that Polish socialism should "apply" and "adapt" general laws, or that Polish socialism should "acknowledge" the general principles of socialism, etc.

In such a formulation the universal laws of building socialism appear as a priori ideals, which remain only to be "applied," "adapted," "acknowledged," etc., yet we do not even know why exactly this should be done. Moreover, such a formulation makes the origin of these laws extremely mysterious. For questions arise: who "established" them, for what purpose, are there goals behind this "establishing," and are these goals at variance with the aspirations of a given people?

Indeed, if the general laws of building socialism are treated as something that exists outside the real social process, outside of real history, then a peculiar fear of them (which one can sense in W. Sokolewicz's article) becomes quite natural.

How, then, should the universal laws of building socialism be treated? What--a philosopher would ask--is their ontological status, that is, how do they exist, how do they manifest themselves? There is no space here to go into this problem exhaustively, so I shall use one example in connection with it.

The ontogenesis of an individual member of a biological species takes place according to certain general laws typical of this species. An individual human being, regardless of eye and hair color or other individual characteristics, develops from the embryonic state

always in accordance with these laws. Human beings differ greatly in their individual biological characteristics, but nonetheless we agree what they are subject to the same general laws of development. This is true not only of the development of the individual human being (ontogenesis) but also of the evolution of the entire species (phylogenesis). In both the process of ontogenesis and of phylogenesis, general laws exist only in their individual, specific manifestations; and these laws are not determined by any goal but by what we may term the necessity of species development (within which they also evolve).

But the above relation can also be considered from another point of view, i.e., from that of the individual member of the species, the concrete human being. The concrete human being is and can be human in a species-specific sense insofar as he is and can be the "result" of the general laws of the species' development.

Of course, the relations between what is general and what is specific and individual in natural processes are obvious and can practically serve as models. They are far more complicated in social processes because of the greater complexity of the latter. Nevertheless, the nature of these relations remains the same.

With this example in mind, let us return to our reflections on socialism. It is correctly asserted that socialism develops according to certain laws, but this is true of every socioeconomic system. It should be remembered, however, that these laws are subject to change, that they are in a constant process of creation, and that as a result of experience accumulated in the building of socialism some of them will be reexamined and supplanted by new ones. This situation was aptly characterized by V. Lenin in "Letters on Tactics:" "The Marxist must take real life into account and consider the exact facts of reality; he must not continue to hang on to yesterday's theory, which, like any theory, at best describes only basic generalities and only approaches an understanding of the complexity of life." ("Works" vol 24, pp 27-28.) Does Lenin's description of the developmental stages of capitalism not confirm the correctness of this type of approach?

The point is not only that the general laws of socialism manifest themselves in processes, but that they do not exist and "do not operate" outside their specific, concrete empirical manifestations. In other words, there are no methods of building socialism except national ones, but neither can socialism be built separately from what is general and universal, i.e., general laws. Universal laws and specific conditions of building socialism are two sides of the same process. It is therefore a mistake to separate them and claim that they permanently conflict with each other, as W. Sokolewicz does in his article. The alternative that he constructs in this connection--either specific Polish features are mechanically adapted to the universal goal (we are then dealing with socialism in "Polish national costume," as he

writes), or the so-called Polish model of socialism is created, the nature of which will lie in the difference between its goals and "socialism in general"--is a false alternative, for, let us repeat once more, it rests upon a fallacious extrasocietal and extrahistorical understanding of that "socialism in general," i.e., the universal laws of building it.

The falseness of this alternative makes such concepts as "Polish socialism" and the "Polish model of socialism" meaningless terms, because they assume the existence not only of specific preconditions for building socialism but also of some kind of "specific laws" (?), the nature of which permanently conflicts with what is universal in the development of socialism (for just what is this thing that W. Sokolewicz calls the permanent programmatic dichotomy of goals and means?).

At any rate, the author himself indirectly confirms in his article the unsuitability of such concepts, as he is often unable to distinguish between what is Polish and what is universal in the development of socialism in our country.* For example, in naming the three varieties of "Polish socialism," he writes that we should expand the social basis of government, and in connection with this "the state cannot be identified with the party, either wholly or in the activity of its individual institutions." What is supposed to be specifically Polish about that? This thesis, after all, can be found in the programs of most communist parties.

The above-mentioned false alternative, and the methodological uselessness of such concepts as "Polish socialism" and the "Polish model of socialism," are evident throughout the article, as for example when W. Sokolewicz writes that "Polish socialism must under no circumstances lead to a weakening of ties with our allies" and when he states that "essential public support for the idea of Polish socialism will be won only when it represents a vision of socialism that emphasizes individualism over collectivism." It should therefore be noted that our ties with our allies are not and cannot be an act of good will on the part of the "Polish model of socialism" but the outcome of the universal laws of socialism, among which proletarian internationalism is one of the most important. In regard to the second statement (leaving aside the fact that the nature of socialism lies in its attempt to resolve the dilemma of individualism and collectivism rather than in the dominance of one of these two factors), we would have great difficulty in popularizing this idea, particularly among workers. They, instead, call attention to the fact that our socialism is not

* Anna Pawlowska made accurate observations on this point in her polemical article "Socialism in Poland, Polish Socialism, or the Polish Path to Socialism," TRYBUNA LUDU 29 Nov 83.

sufficiently universal in nature (whether their contention is correct or not is another matter), and somehow we do not hear any urgent demand for "Polish socialism." It is even said that posing the problem in this way shows a class-oriented, workers' point of view.

It should be noted in passing that the author did not use the concept of the "working class" even once in his article about socialism, its development and its prospects. For whom, then, is this Polish socialism supposed to exist, and who is supposed to realize it?

12277

CSO: 2600/517

PROGRESS OF REPORTS-ELECTION CAMPAIGN EVALUATED

Warsaw ZYCIE PARTII in Polish No 1, 4 Jan 84 p 13

Article by T K: "Conclusions--Continuation"

Text Last month when we were formulating our first impressions of the reports-elections campaign (ZYCIE PARTII No 25, 1983), the meetings of the party groups were coming to a close, meetings of OOP's and POP's were well advanced and the conferences of lower level echelons were just beginning. At the end of last December the campaign had already entered into its new phase--the provincial conferences had begun.

Although it is still too early for a thorough analysis of the campaign proceedings, it is possible to write a sequel to the expectations envisioned a month ago. These will be conclusions based upon the status of the campaign as of the 10th of last December.

At that time the major portion of the campaign had been completed, but the city and final regional conferences were still in progress. In spite of the evident variations in the strength and vigor of individual organizations, the accomplishments of meetings and conferences attest to the pronounced improved standards, the maturity of party members who in the past period have been hardened in the conflict with the political adversary and have learned of the necessity to interact with people.

Preliminary evaluations of the campaign indicate decided approval of the rank and file for the projects brought up at the Ninth Congress, a sincere concern for finding realistic solutions for problems within their establishments and own areas of employment. The larger portion of submitted suggestions points to a deep concern for improvements in productivity, combating wastefulness and for a more effective method of management as a remedy for existing problems.

The great number of problems discussed and the methods employed in determining their degree of importance confirms the definite desire to arrive at the proper conclusions utilizing the benefits of past experience. Let us continue to be the same Marxist-Leninist party,

becoming such through the elimination of mistakes hindering our development. Let us rid our ranks of those people who were not, or are not at the present time, capable of withstanding times of difficulties, those who have succumbed to alien influences or have in any other way violated the party statutes.

The evaluation of the retiring leadership contained in reports and discussions has shown that a decline in party membership did not affect its activities. This confirms the old axiom: "In times of strife the quality and not the number of participants in the ranks determines the outcome."

After conducting the group meetings, we know that there are 31,836 of them. This figure has been fluctuating lately since some of the groups have been phased out, while 580 new groups have been created during the course of the campaign. Of this figure the most, as many as 273, were formed in Katowice Province.

The number of newly elected group members constitute 36.5 percent of the total groups.

By the middle of December, meetings of all 92,654 OOP's and POP's had been held with a 70 percent attendance record. Of those attending, an average of 30 percent participated in the discussions. There was a wide variation from one group to another. As an example, there was 100 percent participation in the smaller POP groups, down to 7 percent in some of the Konin Province meetings.

During the activities of these meetings 4,194 party organizations decided to eliminate 7,749 persons and to expel 135 from the party rolls.

Among the POP and OOP first secretaries elected 27.8 percent are laborers, 15.4 percent are peasants and 52.6 are intellectuals. In these groupings, 18 percent are women and 5.5 young people up to the age of 29. Party indoctrination in excess of 5 years has been had by 89.3 percent of them.

For the first time 36.1 percent of the comrades were elected to the position of POP first secretaries. The smallest number of changes occurred in Ciechanow Province, 28.1 percent; Torun, 28.8 percent; Konin, 29.1 percent; while the biggest were at Gdansk, 51.6 percent; Slupsk, 43 percent.

Within the total number of 228,322 members of POP and OOP executive boards, laborers comprise 35.7 percent; peasants, 8.9 percent; the intelligentsia, 52.2 percent. In the composition of the executive boards 20.3 percent are females and 6.6 percent belong to the younger group. Party indoctrination of more than 5 years' duration has been had by 84.7 percent of the administrators.

For the first time 49.2 percent of the people elected to these positions are comrades. The smallest changes in the makeup of administrative personnel were noted in Krakow Province, 34.7 percent, while the greatest, or 69.4 percent, occurred in Wloclawek Province.

Meetings and conferences have been already completed in all of the 2,047 plant organizations [KZ]. We have detailed information covering 96 percent of the conferences that have been held up to 12 December of last year. For this reason we will present only some of the data, since the final figures may require some adjustment.

Of the 1970 KZ first secretaries, 20.1 percent are laborers and 78.1 percent are of the intelligentsia. Young people up to the age of 29 barely constitute 2.3 percent of this category and in 24 provinces they were not even considered to be eligible for this post. For the first time, 29.9 percent of comrades became KZ first secretaries.

At the same time, of the 31,876 KZ members elected, laborers comprised 40.6 percent peasants 4.1 percent, and 54.1 percent belong to the intelligentsia. For the first time 55.2 percent of comrades were elected to KZ membership functions.

Up to 12 December 1983 1,628 meetings and conferences on the gmina, city-gmina, city and regional levels were held, which amounts to 68.2 percent of their total number of 2,386.

Even before we are able to provide final figures, it is possible for us to arrive at the conclusion that starting with the composition of the KZ executive boards, continuing on through the administration rosters of the basic level committees, there appears a characteristic tendency pointing to a pronounced imbalance favoring the intellectual sector occupying managerial positions. The gmina committees staffing, 50.5 percent; city-gmina committees, 58.2 percent; and in city committees, 67.4 percent. If we add to this the fact that of the delegates to the provincial conferences who were elected by the 12th of last December, 64.9 were intellectuals, 14.6 percent laborers, 17.9 percent peasants, then we see a distinct trend developing in the leadership of the party.

It may still be too early for an in-depth analysis, but it is advisable to alert the delegates to the provincial conferences that if a similar imbalance favoring the intelligentsia class should occur at the provincial committee and executive body elections, then the questioning of the class character of the leadership of a labor party could be justified.

It is appropriate to quote the opinion of deputy member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee Wlodzimierz Mokrzyaszczak. In his interview published in the 19 December 1983 edition of TRYBUNA LUDU,

in response to the question: "Is it possible to have a positive estimate of the elections if you look at them from the viewpoint of workers' participation?", he answered:

"No, At the outset I will say that the proportionate number of laborers in positions of first secretaries is lower than their total participation in the party. It is somewhat more favorable among the members of the executive boards and KZ, but still not satisfactory. You cannot absolve this state of affairs by claiming that it has been 'inherited' from former administrations, or by presenting some other arguments. As an example, based on the findings of an extensive statistical poll, it has been established that over 80 percent of the party members considered to be intellectuals come from worker or peasant families.

"I see no reason to keep secret the fact that we have brought to the attention of all committees the necessity to increase the participation of the laborers in party administration. This does not involve any infringement on democracy, but presents the case clearly before the electorate. The party also has to belong to the workers in the structure of its authority."

When this edition of the ZYCIE PARTII reaches the reader the provincial party organizations will have completed their conferences in: Biala Podlaska, Bydgoszoz, Czestochowa, Kalisz, Pila, Tarnobrzeg and Zielona Gora. Because of conferences were compacted into three weeks of the month of January of this year, the editorial staff is preparing a special edition of ZYCIE PARTII dedicated exclusively to the coverage of these provincial conferences, which will be published this February.

12306
CSO: 2600/541

DEFENSE MINISTRY SEEKS OFFICER SCHOOL CANDIDATES

Academies, Other Schools

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 30 Nov 83 p 5

/Article: "Ministry of National Defense Communique on Recruitment of Candidates for Military Academies and Higher Officers Schools"

/Text/ The Ministry of National Defense announces voluntary recruitment of candidates to the following military academies and higher officer training schools:

- the J.Dabrowski Military Technical Academy in Warsaw;
- the B.Szarecki Military Medical Academy in Lodz;
- the Heroes of Westerplatte Higher Naval Officers School in Gdynia;
- the T.Kosciuszko Higher Mechanized Troop Officers School in Wroclaw;
- the S.Czarnecki Higher Tank Troop Officers School in Poznan;
- the J.Krasicki Higher Air Force Officers School in Deblin;
- the J.Bem Higher Rocket and Artillery Officers School in Torun;
- the M.Kalinowski Higher Antiaircraft Defense Officers School in Koszalin;
- the S.Bartosik Higher Radio Officers School in Jelenia Gora;
- the J.Jasinski Higher Engineering Officers School in Wroclaw;
- the B.Kowalski "Ryszard" Higher Signal Officers School in Zegierz near Warsaw;
- the S.Zlaja Higher Chemical Troop Officers School in Krakow;
- the A.Warszkiewicz Higher Automotive Officers School in Pila;
- the M.~~Butzel~~ Higher Quartermaster Services Officer School in Poznan.

The term of studies is: 6 years at the Military Technical Academy, 6 years for a medical degree from the Military Medical Academy, and 6 and 5 years respectively for degrees in stomatology and pharmacology, 5 years at the Higher Naval School and 4 years at all of the officers schools.

Graduates of military academies and higher officers schools are promoted to the rank of second lieutenant in the Polish Army and receive a diploma for higher studies and the title of master /magister/ engineer, doctor, stomatologist, or master /magister/ of pharmacy or engineering and a command in their respective military specialization.

Furthermore, at eight military institutes of higher learning (the Higher Naval Officers School, Higher Mechanized Troop Officers School, Higher Tank Troop Officers School, Higher Rocket and Artillery Officers School, Higher Engineering Officers School, Higher Antiaircraft Defense Officers School, Higher Air Force Officers School, and the Higher Signal Officers School), there is a course of military-political studies. Graduates of this field of studies receive a diploma in social and political sciences.

Candidates for military academies and higher officers schools must meet the following requirements:

- Polish citizenship;
- proper moral and political values;
- certification from the appropriate military medical commission that the applicant is capable of military service as a candidate for career soldier;
- unmarried;
- 24 years of age or younger except for the Military Medical Academy, for which the applicant may be no older than 22.

An additional condition for admittance to the Higher Naval Officers School and the Higher Air Force Officers School is the candidate's proper physical fitness, certified by special military (naval and air force) medical commissions.

Candidates competing for admission to one of the schools named must submit applications to the commandant of their chosen school through their local draft board while candidates already enlisted must apply through their own units.

Applications can be obtained from draft boards or the staffs of military units.

The following items must be attached to applications:

-- a copy of the candidate's birth certificate and a certificate of Polish citizenship if the candidate does not yet have personal identification;

-- a school certificate confirming the required education. Pupils in their last year of studies at middle school should present certification of their enrollment in that year and on graduation, they must immediately present their graduation certificate and a certificate of their next to last year of studies.

-- the opinion of a social or political organization, school or place of work.

The deadlines of submitting applications and documentation are 10 May 1984 for the Higher Naval Officers School and the Higher Air Force Officers School and 19 May 1984 for the Military Technical Academy, Military Medical Academy and remaining higher officers schools.

Candidates are required to take a competitive entrance examination on their middle school studies.

Entrance examinations, physical fitness tests and qualifications interviews will be held 19-30 June 1984 at the Higher Naval Officers School, 19-24 June 1984 at the Higher Air Force Officers School, and 2-9 July 1984 at the Military Technical Academy and the Military Medical Academy and remaining higher officers schools. Meanwhile, the uniform entrance examination for the Military Medical Academy will be held on a date to be announced by the minister of health and social welfare for all other medical academies. Psychological testing of candidates will be conducted in the military psychological centers of the individual military districts and in school and trade psychological consultation centers in the various departments of education and training on announced dates.

Interested candidates can receive more information from their local draft boards, units headquarters or from the military school administrations. Information is also available in guidebooks for candidates to military trade schools and military institutes of higher learning.

Warrant, Noncommissioned Officer Schools

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 15 Dec 83 pp 1,5

/Article: "Ministry of National Defense Communique on Recruitment of Candidates to Warrant Officers Schools and Noncommissioned Officers Trade Schools for 1984-1985"/

/Text/ The Ministry of National Defense announced voluntary recruitment to the following warrant officers and noncommissioned officers schools:

- the Mechanized Troop Warrant Officers School in Elblag: 1-year course (for candidates having already served or who after admission to school will fulfill their 12-month basic service) and a 3-year course;
- the Rocket and Artillery Warrant Officers School in Torun (2-year);
- the Antiaircraft Defense Warrant Officers School in Koszalin (2-year);
- the Tank Troop Warrant Officers School in Poznan (2-year);
- the Automotive Service and Tank Troop Warrant Officers School in Pila (2- and 3-year);
- the Air Force Warrant Officers School in Deblin (2-year);
- the Radiotechnical Warrant Officers School in Jelenia Gora (2- and 3-year);
- the Technical Personnel Warrant Officers School in Olesnica and the Air Force Warrant Officers School in Zamosc (2- and 3-year and 3 year, respectively);
- the Political Warrant Officers School in Lodz (2-year);
- the Engineering Troop Warrant Officers School and the Military Communications Warrant Officers School in Wroclaw (2- and 3-year, respectively);
- the Internal Military Services Warrant Officers School in Minsk Mazowiecki (2-year);
- the Armaments Troops Warrant Officers School (2-year) and the Electronics Warrant Officers School (3-year) in Olsztyn;
- the Quartermaster Services Warrant Officers School in Poznan (1- and 2-year);
- the Naval Warrant Officers School in Gdynia (2-year);
- the Signal Warrant Officers School in Legnica (2- and 3-year);
- the Border Defense Warrant Officers School in Ketrzyn (2-year);
- the Topographical Service Warrant Officers School in Torun (2-year).

The warrant officers schools prepare candidates for professional military service in the warrant officer corps.

The course of studies in warrant officers schools lasts from 1 to 3 years. Graduates of trade middle schools or general education secondary schools are admitted for 1- and 2-year studies. Graduation of primary trade schools are admitted for 3-year studies.

The following requirements must be met by candidates for warrant officers schools: Polish citizenship, proper moral values, the ability to meet military service as a career candidate as certified by a military medical commission, unmarried, and between 17 and 24 years of age.

Candidates competing for admission to one of the schools named must submit applications to the commandant of their chosen school through their local draft board while candidates already enlisted must apply through their own units. Applications can be obtained from draft boards or the staffs of military units. The following items must be attached to applications:

-- a copy of the candidate's birth certificate and a certificate of Polish citizenship if the candidate does not yet have personal identification;

- a school certificate confirming the required education (candidates attending their last year of middle school or primary trade school may present the proper certification of proof of attendance in their given year of study);

-- the opinion of the school director, social and political organizations or place of work.

The deadlines for submitting applications and documentation are 10 May 1984 for the Naval Warrant Officers School and the Air Force Warrant Officers School and 1 June 1984 for the remaining warrant officers schools.

Middle school graduates are accepted to warrant officers schools without an entrance examination on the basis of a qualifications procedure. They are, however, required to take physical fitness and psychological tests. All other candidates are required to take an entrance examination on the Polish language (written), mathematics (written and oral) and on primary trade school subjects relevant to their course of studies at the given warrant officers school.

Psychological and physical fitness testing and entrance examinations will be held 19-30 June 1984 for the Naval Warrant Officers School and 25-28 June 1984 for the Air Force Warrant Officers School. Remaining warrant officers schools will schedule tests for 11-17 July 1984.

On their completion of final examinations, the graduates of 1- and 2-year warrant officer schools will receive a school diploma and graduates of 3-year schools receive a middle school certificate. Graduates are also promoted to the rank of junior warrant officer and receive professional positions in units matching their qualifications.

Professional noncommissioned officer candidates are also being recruited for the following arms and services:

1) Mechanized troops, tank troops, rocket and artillery troops, air force troops, rocket antiaircraft defense troops, antiaircraft defense troops, chemical troops, engineering troops, signal troops, radio communications troops, army communications service, army health service, the navy, quartermaster service, arms service, housing and construction service, army internal service, and border defense troops.

The requirements for volunteers:

-- age at least 17 years;

-- graduation from a primary trade school or completion of at least 2 years of middle school;

-- ability to perform military service;

-- proper moral and political values and an irreproachable past.

Candidates meeting the above requirements may submit their applications to their local draft board and declare their desire for voluntary enlistment in primary military service.

Volunteers are called up for service annually in the spring or fall. After they have finished primary services noncommissioned officers school and completed 18 months (24 months for naval candidates) of practice in military units, they can be placed in career service. They are then sent to 6-month courses at respective noncommissioned officers trade schools.

The processing of applications to the Naval Noncommissioned Officers Trade School as well as noncommissioned officers schools in other arms and branches last 1 year.

Candidates competing for admission to the Naval Noncommissioned Officers School in Ustka are required to pass a physical fitness test, psychological test and a physical examination by the Naval Medical Military Commission.

2) Candidates are being recruited for the Military Secondary Music School in Gdansk. Only cadets from military orchestras, graduates of first-class (same level) state music schools, pupils of secondary schools of music and second-class state music schools are eligible to apply. Candidates must be between 15 and 16 years of age. Applications to this school will be accepted until 19 May 1984.

3) The Air Force Secondary Schools of the Air Force Higher Officers School in Deblin and Zielona Gora are also accepting applications.

These are trade schools offering a secondary school curriculum, training candidates for service in the Air Force and, above all, preparation for study at the Air Force Higher Officers School in Deblin.

Candidates must meet the following requirements: Polish citizenship, less than 16 years of age, completion of 8 years of primary school, air force medical examination certifying physical and psychological fitness for future service in the air force, and written permission of parents (or legal guardians) for the candidate, after completion of secondary school, to enter the Air Force Higher Officers School as a career officer candidate.

Candidates for Air Force Secondary Schools must submit applications no later than 15 April to: Air Force Secondary School, Jan Krasinski Air Force School, 08-521 Deblin.

Candidates interested in applying to submitting applications to warrant officers schools and noncommissioned officers trade schools may obtain more information from draft boards or staffs of military formations.

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YUGOSLAVIA

'NEW RIGHTIST' VIEW DISCUSSED

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24-25 Dec 83 p 2

[Article by Jovan Radovanovic: "Domestic Trappings of the New Right"]

[Text] The convincing victories of conservatives in western Europe and in the U.S. in the last elections have perhaps surprised a few people here and there, but those who have followed these shifts more carefully are calmly concluding that the long-range "quiet work" of the New Right is in no way giving birth to innocent offspring. Because if the common motif of all the opinions about the world situation is the assertion that there has been, in fact, a deep structural crisis throughout the last 10 years, then the breakthrough of the Right confirms one more observation--the world crisis has had a stimulative effect on its international expansion.

Something else must also be recognized. Too often we become accustomed to thinking in black-and-white cliches, we are surprised by the quite reasonable phenomena that the two movements in the bourgeois world (liberal and conservative), which were rivals until recently, now find a common language not only in anticommunism, or antisocialism, but in the fact that they have converged so much that in the contemporary movements of so-called neoliberalism and neoconservatism they quite seriously speak of "conservative liberalism" and "liberal conservatism." Of course, we are not concerned here with some terminological confusion, but ultimately with the interweaving of the same interests--the defense of capital.

The bourgeois world is always in a state of expansion--of both its value and ideological systems--when the Left is in retreat, when the socialist world, crushed by its own internal contradictions, is unable to respond to problems imposed upon it by today's world, resolving them in the old ways. It seems to us that this is a fact which does not have to be proven in any special way. Because of this, as well as the simple fact that since we do not live on an island, far from the world's influences, we hear more and more frequently the claim that a unique New Right is being born in our country, we are forced to consider the basic question--how much of it is only imitative, and how much of its trappings are those of authentic, domestic costumes? We will try to present some sort of an answer to this question in this column from discussions which took place at the Serbian Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the LCY concerning the ideologies of the New Right.

In our country, the Right has several basic features. The most destructive, which has ultimately been expressed with the sword throughout history, is a nationalistic-chauvinistic ideology. The most obvious in this century, Petar Zivadinovic said without hesitation, spawned the most dreadful counterrevolution--fascism. Nationalism in our country is connected with a certain type of fundamentalism, whether Christian (Orthodox or Catholic), or Muslim, although our primitive, Balkan variety of it follows "world" trends and, when all the trappings are removed, is ultimately engaged in defending exploitation, defending capital relationships.

The Bureaucratic Right

The Right in our country, then, is connected with the reaffirmation of the outdated prebourgeois consciousness which emerges in a certain type of primitive Balkan authoritarianism, according to Lino Veljak, and which is obliged to be overlaid with a veil of Marxist phraseology, and to solicit self-management. Veljak brought out another type of "domestic" Right, which was born under direct influences from the West. It is based on the merciless criticism of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but it is criticism which actually equates Marxism with Stalinism.

"Our very reality must be oriented more in the self-management-socialist direction in order to be successful in checking the sources and influences of bourgeois rightist tendencies," said Zoran Vidojevic. "Traditional rightist tendencies are only one way to return to the past. Dogmatism and 'leftist' positivism are also restorative practices and ideologies."

One must keep in mind, according to Vidojevic, that in our society the right wing is made up not only of the traditional rightist intelligentsia, the bourgeois, and its offshoot, the petit bourgeois, but that objectively it is also made up of the statist, bureaucratic Right. The problem with the Right and the rapid growth of its points of origination is all the more difficult because this other Right, the bureaucratic Right, is found within certain elements of the system itself, because it is the major, objective producer and product of making the myth of the state, and that which is the essence of the state, absolute, whether in the form of a national state, or a supernational state.

To this opinion, Najdan Pasic added: "This neoconservative ideology is emerging in our country in the form of institutional fetishism, in defense of the status quo. Of course, those strongest in defending the status quo are those who enjoy positions of authority, and this means the factions of the professional administrative structure in the economy, and especially in politics."

Explaining that instead of self-management regulation of different interests an overstated institutionalization of these interests is imposed, all under the mask of defending the interests of a too-weak associated labor, which concludes by deforming certain revolutionary concepts, from concepts of self-management interest communities, self-management control of the national surplus of labor, to concepts of self-management agreements and contracts, Pasic concludes:

"One gets a shocking thought--this ideology of institutional conservatism in its self-management variant actually has bound up the basic citizenry of society, the working class. This overstated institutionalism turns against the worker, and under new historical conditions, against the essential values of socialism themselves, against the degree of freedom of activity of self-management individuals who have power in today's society."

The remark of Zoran Vidojevic is interesting in this context. He said that it is not advisable to identify bureaucracy and the bureaucratic Right with the so-called "administrative strata," just as it is illogical to attribute to this strata A PRIORI leftist determinations and positions of interest of the Left and the broader society. The essence of this strata, according to Vidojevic, is deeply contradictory, just as the essence of the working class is contradictory in a social sense.

It was mentioned in the discussion that one does not dare underestimate those conservative forces which persist in the demand that the LCY be turned into a "party of order" as part of a strategy for "saving socialism," as well as those, in opposition to the above, who see the only way out of the present difficulties to be the introduction of a two-party or a multi-party system.

The socialist conception of democracy and freedom is a new breakthrough in the liberation of man, so that neglecting the basic emancipatory role of self-management socialism and insisting on some sort of multiparty democracy means only a profound lack of comprehension of these processes, according to Aleksandar Grlickov. The mistake is in thinking that the multi-party system automatically means faster progress for human freedom and democracy in our country. The mistake is also in thinking, stresses Grlickov, that the question of authority is solved behind a round table; it is solved in critical historic moments, and the problem of authority can be solved in the way it came to the new Yugoslavia, in a socialist, self-management community of equal nations and nationalities.

False Alternative

"The alternative between the one-party and the two-party system is essentially false," said Lino Veljak. "We need a reaffirmation of self-management, of a liberated, normative idealization."

All of the participants in the discussion agreed with this, and Zoran Vidojevic interceded in favor of abandoning the myth of the theory of the "socialist one-party system," as well as of the "bourgeois multiparty system," emphasizing; "The LCY, according to the resolutions of its program, is not placed in the dilemma of the one-party or the two-party system. The LCY can be a modern vanguard if it is practically and theoretically above this dilemma, if it keeps it outside of itself in ideology and in practice. Acute political, ideological and theoretical struggles are emerging over these questions today. Indeed, in our very social reality and even in certain elements of the LCY itself, there are tendencies for the strengthening not only of the one-party system, but of the

multiparty system; moreover, the latter has also some elements of what might be conditionally characterized as a one-party multiparty system."

"It is illogical that we behave in an inferior manner when these theses about the multiparty system are in question," said Grlickov. "Our counterstrategy cannot be based only on theoretical, ideological breakthroughs, on substantiated justifications, but on the implementation of our own program, and this means in the accelerated democratization of the LCY, in demonopolizing the LCY from the leadership role in the ideological-political force; this also means creating a Socialist League as a real front for all socialist forces whose boundary marker is the constitutional system, socialist self-management, equality of nations and nationalities, republics and provinces, a state of nonalignment."

To end this article, which has no pretensions of "covering" all aspects of the discussions which lasted many hours, we believe that the words of Zoran Vidojevic can serve as a worthy conclusion.

"Seeking refuge in the ideologies of the past is an indicator of the state of society itself, the limits of socialist practice itself, the unsolvability, or the ineffective solvability, of some vital problems from genuinely socialistic positions... Restorative tendencies are not abolished by a return of faith in self-management socialism. The spirit of defeatism and the fear of catastrophe are not eliminated by pseudo-optimism, with its typically false leftist, optimistic point of view. Self-management socialism does not rest on faith but on productive, political, and cultural hypotheses, on the class struggle, for the realization of its essential goals, in which the unity of class action, the activity and transportation of the LCY have great significance. Without this, one has no right to negate rightist tendencies in our society."

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END